Clarifying the scope of the ITRs to exclude the Internet

[Norbert Bollow <nb@xxx>]

The following comments on the "DRAFT OF THE FUTURE ITRS" document are
from Norbert Bollow, Civil Society, in Switzerland.


It is my carefully considered view that it is highly desirable for the
ITRs to have a clearly defined domain of applicability which includes
classical telecommunication services (voice communication and fax
services in which classical telephone numbers are used as addressing
elements) but which clearly excludes the Internet (except when voice
communication and fax services in which classical telephone numbers
are used as addressing elements are provided via the Internet.)


Major reasons for this view include the following:

1) Much of what is laid down in the ITRs is technically suitable for
classical telecommunication services, but not for the Internet in
general. If the attempt was made to fully apply the provisions of the
ITRs to the Internet, it would be found that many of the provisions
are fundamentally incompatible with how the Internet works, and it is
not possible to apply them to the Internet without effectively
destroying the Internet. (That of course is not going to happen.
The Member States would find some way to justify themselves in acting
contrary to what the ITRs say. But it is highly desirable to avoid
that kind of situation by clearly excluding from the scope of the ITRs
forms of ICTs to which the provisions of the ITRs are not applicable.)

2) If the ITRs were adapted to the technical realities of the Internet,
it would still be unacceptable for Internet governance to be governed
by the modified ITRs, since the Internet is a highly dynamic, quickly
evolving socio-technical reality, and the existing governance process
for modifications of the ITRs is clearly not suitable for the
governance of something which is as highly dynamic as the Internet.

3) Even if the process of updating the ITRs could be changed to make
it fast and dynamic enough that from that perspective it might
potentially meet the governance needs of the Internet, the problem
would remain that the ITRs are an intergovernmental agreement, and
hence any process for updating them must fundamentally be an
intergovernmental process, and the problem of how information
regarding the Internet and information society concerns in general can
be effectively exchanged between government persons, civil society and
the technical community is still unsolved in most if not all
countries. I hope that my "Enhanced Cooperation Task Force (ECTF)"
proposal (*) may contribute to this problem eventually getting solved,
but until it is solved, it would in my eyes be imprudent in the
extreme to entrust the Internet to any kind of purely intergovernmental
process.

(*) Note: The rules for submitting comments do not allow me to include
a link to the proposal, but the Internet-Draft about it can be found
e.g. by means of a web search for "draft-bollow-ectf-02".


In view of the above, my comments on the various items in the "DRAFT
OF THE FUTURE ITRS" document are as follows:


CWG/4/19: This proposed modification is not good because it would by
implication extend the scope of the ITRs to ICTs in general including
the Internet.


CWG/4/20: This proposed modification is not good because "greater
confidence and security, including of information" does not make a lot
of sense in the context of classical telecommunication services;
however an extension of the scope of the ITRs to include the Internet
is not desirable as argued above.


CWG/4/45 - CWG/4/53: All of these definition proposals fail to clarify
the scope of the ITRs by clearly excluding the Internet as such.

Here is my alternative proposal:

  Telecommunication: Any transmission, emission or reception of signs,
  signals, writing, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by
  wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic systems or via the
  Internet, where the intended recipient or communication partner is
  identified by a telephone number.

  Note: This includes uses of telecommunication services where the use
  of a telephone number for identifying the intended recipient or
  communication partner is not visible to the end user.


CWG/4/110: The final bracket includes a reference to "IP
interconnections" which is not good because it would imply an
extension of the scope of the ITRs to include the Internet,
which is not desirable as argued above.


CWG/4/113: This proposed modification is not good because it would by
implication extend the scope of the ITRs to ICTs in general including
the Internet.


CWG/4/165: This proposed modification is not good for the same reason.


CWG/4/178: This proposed modification is not good for the same reason.
Note however that if my definition proposal of "telecommunication
services" as give above is adopted, the requirement of the unmodified
paragraph 4.3c can be fulfilled by assuring that publicly accessible
Internet access is available through which telecommunication services
can be accessed.


CWG/4/199: This proposed addition is not good because it would extend
the scope of the ITRs to including Internet Protocol traffic exchanges.


CWG/4/221 - CWG/4/233: I will not discuss these in detail, but to the
extent that the proposed new articles imply an extension of the scope
of the ITRs to include the Internet, they are not good.

On the other hand, a new article would be valuable that puts added
emphasis on privacy protection with regard to data collected while
providing communication services, since this includes highly sensitive
personal data (about communication parties and in the context of
mobile telephones also data about where the user of the telephone was
at what time) to which unauthorized access can have high commercial
value. For example, in my opinion there can be no doubt that if such
data is stored at all, the concerned people must have the right to
access copies of it. They must have the right to know whether the way
in which this data is stored is adequately protected from unauthorized
access, with certified conformance to international standards such as
ISO/IEC 27001. They must have the right to know when the data is
deleted (which of course must include the destruction of all backup
media) etc.