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Work item:
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TR.hyb_qsafe
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Subject/title:
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Technical Report: Overview of key management of hybrid approaches for quantum-safe communications
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Status:
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Under study
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Approval process:
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Agreement
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Type of work item:
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Technical report
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Version:
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New
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Equivalent number:
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-
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Timing:
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2025-03 (Medium priority)
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Liaison:
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ITU-T SG11, SG13 and SG15, ETSI ISG-QKD, ETSI TC-Cyber QSC
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Supporting members:
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Korea (Rep. of), SK Telecom, ID Quantique, SA, CAS Quantum Network Co. Ltd., National University of Singapore
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Summary:
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QKD can guarantee the information-theoretical security for key exchange, but it requires special devices and network infrastructure. PQC algorithms have been developed to be safe against quantum computer attacks, but, they are still based on computational security, which means they can be broken by new emerging algorithms in the future. Furthermore, there are no widely accepted commercial systems that use PQC yet. NIST has been working on the standardization of PQC algorithms for several years, but it is not yet complete, which means that it will take more time for the final algorithm(s) to be applied to security protocols and used in real-world networks. In order for the algorithms finally selected by NIST to be used in actual communication networks, other SDOs may need further standardization. Therefore, it is natural to use both methods (QKD and PQC) and/or other proprietary solutions properly depending on the use cases before we have a full picture of PQC. Even for PQC community, hybrid approaches with existing cryptography have been discussed and recommended. In ITU-T deliverables, QKDN deals with the key management inside of QKDN to supply to the cryptographic applications. To realize quantum-safe communications with hybrid approaches with QKD and PQC, it is important for service providers to consider all available technologies and have the option to take them. Given the situation where each candidate technology is only considered for their use cases and assumptions, it is suggested to study key management with hybrid approaches with QKD and PQC compared to current key management of QKDN for quantum-safe communications to consider the possible use cases and the scenarios with available technologies to find additional requirements for the scenarios and gaps to fulfill. Quantum-safe refers to the use of methods that are resistant to attacks by quantum computers, in order to keep information assets secure even after a large-scale quantum computer has been built. In short, quantum-safe means safe against quantum computing attacks. This work item will fill the missing area of study on security of QKDN in SG17. This WI will refer the existing Recommendations and on-going draft Recommendations in SG17.
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Comment:
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-
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Reference(s):
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Historic references:
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Contact(s):
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First registration in the WP:
2023-03-06 09:09:16
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Last update:
2024-03-11 13:00:14
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