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Workshop on Telecommunications for Disaster Relief |
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Geneva, 17-19 February 2003 |
Contact: tsbworkshops@itu.int |
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Télécoms Sans Frontières comments on TDR User Requirements
(26/Feb/2003)
The following only represents Télécoms Sans Frontières' point of view
as regards TDR User Requirements and that we do not suggest that we
can define the needs of relief efforts themselves, we can only give
you our opinion based on what we have seen in the field. The needs
will depend on who the relief efforts are, what they are hoping to
achieve etc. and there may be aspects of the problem that we are not
aware of, others that we have simply not thought of in the course of
this particular discussion, and we may highlight aspects that other
organisations are not concerned with etc.
As mentionned during the ITU-T TDR workshop held in Geneva, 17-19
February 2003, there is nothing standard about disasters and it is
therefore difficult to standardise the requirements. Nevertheless we
believe that a crisis can be broadly divided into four phases (keeping
in mind however that in a disaster scenario, different locations of
the affected area may go through these four phases at different
speeds). These four phases we have called:
- chaos
- organised chaos
- temporary solutions
- normality/post emergency
to which we would add a preliminary phase:
The chaos phase immediately follows the onset of a disaster. In this
phase, there is no coordination between any of the people in the
affected area, everyone does what they can to save lives, tell the
outside world about the crisis by whatever means they can etc. This
chaos phase is inevitable. The duration of this phase is dependent on:
- the type of disaster
- the extent of the disaster (in terms of area and number of victims)
- the distance (time) from nearest working telecoms
- the distance (time) from relief efforts
- degree of preparedness
Of these factors, the only one that can be influenced is the degree of
preparedness (which may in turn influence the distance from nearest
working telecoms and relief efforts). Keeping in mind that several
factors influence the duration, we would say this phase lasts a few
hours to about 48hrs.
In terms of telecommunications, the problems can be subdivided into
three broad categories that may overlap:
- lack of infrastructure (even in normal times there are no communication
facilities - remote areas/war torn countries etc.)
- sudden (or progressive) overload of the existing network (an existing
infrastructure that cannot respond to an increase in demand due to
more people wanting to phone)
- destruction of existing telecommunication means which means less
means to communicate, usually coupled with more people wanting to phone
The extent of the problem will be dependent on:
- the power autonomy of the existing telecommunication infrastructure
(e.g. paradoxically, there can be a situation where there are
telecoms in the first 24-48hrs say because relays have that power
autonomy and then batteries run out and there is a telecoms black out)
- the diversity of existing telecoms infrastructure (if there is only
one system e.g. fixed lines, then it is more probable that there is a
complete blackout than if there is a combination of telecom means:
fixed lines, mobile phones etc.)
- the configuration of the infrastructure (if relays e.g. are
distributed in a star shaped system it will be more robust than a
linear system where the destruction of one point of the line means a
blackout of the entire line)
- the existing telecommunication company's capacity to respond to
emergencies
The second phase 'organised chaos' covers the progressive transition
from chaos through organised chaos to temporary solutions. Organised
chaos is the phase where relief efforts, coming in from the outside
world, start being coordinated. In many ways, the role of emergency
telecommunications is to facilitate the transition between chaos and
temporary solutions/post emergency as smoothly and as rapidly as
possible. The duration of this phase will depend again on:
- the type of disaster;
- the extent of the disaster (in terms of area and number of victims);
- the degree of preparedness; and
- the telecommunication means that are placed at the disposal of
the relief efforts.
In our experience, and depending on all the factors mentionned above,
the phase of organised chaos lasts anything between a few hours and
about 7-8 days.
The question relief efforts are immediately faced with in the field
is: are we 'simply' managing the sequels of a disaster or are we
having to manage the sequels of a disastrous event AND the
continuation of the problem? For example, there is a difference
between managing flooding resulting from the collapse of a dam and
managing flooding resulting from continuing downpour. In this
respect, conflicts and complex humanitarian crises are different to
natural disasters.
In this phase, the priority is to render relief efforts autonomous in
their communications and to increase the speed of information flow
between the affected area and the CCC. This involves above all getting
the information from the affected area to the Crisis Coordination
Centre(s). These CCC are not fixed entities: they can be a local
firemen HQ; a tent to which all relief efforts converge ; Internally
Displaced People centres etc. The importance of the CCC will also
depend on its distance from organisations' HQ.
Communication means must therefore be set up between:
- Field Operations (teams dispatched throughout the affected area to
provide relief and assessments) and the Crisis Coordination Centre
- the Crisis Coordination Centre and organisations' headquarters so
they can take the necessary decisions concerning the nature and extent
of relief efforts to send in
- Field Operations and Field Operations
Depending on the areal extent of the disaster, each of these will be
more or less important. If the distance between FOs and CCC is small,
teams can report back to the CCC. If the distance is large, providing
telecom means will be vital. The same can be said of communications
between FO and FO. In a large disaster area, there may well be several
CCC that also need to be in contact between each other.
So, the priority is to provide the CCC with:
- The means to communicate by dejamming communication channels i;e ;
increasing telecom capacity and
- Providing the CCC with priority communication channels (e.g. firemen
may be provided with radios that are completely saturated/jammed, they
then try to use the fixed standard phone lines whose numbers
unfortunately are known to the general public reulting in a jammed
telephone exchange -- providing them with a satellite telephone
increases their telecom capacity and gives them a priority line which
they can use for their own itnernal purposes the number of which is
not known to the general public)
- Once the CCC is equipped, we must provide links with different
locations in the affected area (by crisscrossing the affected area)
and then
- Accelerate the information back from the field to the CCC (not
exactly the same thing as providing the technical links is not
sufficient, it is also necessary that all relief efforts are aware
that these links exist and use them) until finally the
- CCC is fully autonomous
Preparedness will speed this process up.
After this stage, links to the FO are maintained/increased/moved in
function of events - the need then for mobile telecoms becomes
evident.
Finally, the affected population can be offered communications either
through travelling itinerant teams or through fixed telephone
exchanges at central points (IDP centres etc.). The help relatives can
provide victims/survivors is often going to be faster, more
appropriate then the help authorities can give victims/survivors
whether in material terms or in psychological terms. By reducing the
load authorities/relief efforts have to take on, efficiency is
increased.
And so to user requirements: in an ideal world, every region in the
world would have an existing public telecommunication infrastructure
that would be easily repaired and have a large power autonomy as well
as incorporate the capability to make a sudden switch to a larger
capacity to cope with a sudden increase in demand.
The world not being ideal, palliative measures must:
- be reliable (of course)
- be global (unless they have been prepositioned)
- have high battery capacity/power autonomy
- be mobile/robust
- to get to the affected area quickly
- because as time goes by some areas may recover
working telecoms and it may be necessary therefore
to move the centre
- to get to the population
- to give to FO
- be of the plug and play variety (fast set up)
Attention should be paid to
- the possibility for the equipment to work inside/outside offices
- the simplicity of usage
The priority in the first few hours and days of this phase is voice
communication, as time goes by and the transition from organised chaos
to temporary solutions is made, email/internet/fax access become more
important and voice coms can diminish. An important contribution to
efficiency in this phase may be provided by visio emergency systems
that can transmit live videos of the situation.
A simple problem that often arises is the difficulty in having the
right telephone number. Often, people have a telephone number without
an area code or country code, the latter of which is relatively easy
to find, the former much harder - there is an international yellow
pages and maybe one aspect of emergency telecoms could be that these
become free in times of crises? or maybe there could be an easily
accessible database ...
The issue of cost is not clear cut because in the emergency phase,
there are usually funds to cover the needs.
In terms of security, in TSF's opinion and experience for example in
setting up a wireless network in Afghanistan, it may be a false
problem in this phase because in an emergency there is no time to
breach the security. The problem of security has more to do with the
definition of procedural security measures rather than technical
aspects of security. In this respect, an important aspect of
preparedeness is to integrate emergency telecommunications within
security / preparedness strategies. For example, if an organisation
has one or more satellite telephones that can be used in emergencies,
much time is wasted if the telephone numbers are not known to the
staff members.
Once the chaos is under control, temporary communications have been
set up and all relief teams are aware of the numbers and procedures,
we move into the temporary solutions phase where relief efforts work
with what has been set up for them until national telecom companies
can repair the infrastructure and return to normality (keeping in mind
that a return to normality in some cases where the infratructure was
non existant may be worse than this temporary phase) and also that in
the case of conflicts/humanitarian crisis etc. this temporary
solutions phase can drag on for months. If this phase lasts for mo,
example sct or humanitarian crisis, there can be a gradual shift from
emergency telecom means to more permanent solutions such as VSAT which
however require technically specialised operators, license agreements
with the government etc.
As we have seen, preparedness is partly the key to the length of time
spent within each phase and practically the only factor on which we
can have an influence. Some of the aspects we believe preparedness
should focus on are:
- involving the national/local telecom companies in the anticipation of
disasters AND in the response phase (for example, in the case of a
continuing disaster they could go round the area connecting relays to
electrical generators before the relays go down)
- preparing coordination of the disaster: who does what, when, where .. who
leads ? etc.
- defining emergency standards and procedures: simple things that TSF has
acquired as reflexes through its experience (e.g. anyone sent out to take a
phone line to the field should always have two phones, in case one doesn't
work; never count on the exisiting electrical supply in cases of ongoing
crises etc.)
- prepositioning equipment (to repair existing infrastructure;
to temporarily replace destroyed or compensate for jamming)
- basic training on the specificities of emergency telecoms
Télécoms Sans Frontières is currently developing preparedness
operations in Haiti and Nicaragua.
Anyone interested in further information, particularly of a technical
nature, can contact Stephane Latxague or Thibaut Derrien at TSF.
Alice Sessa
Stephane Latxague / Thibaut Derrien (for technical matters)
Télécoms sans Frontières
20 avenue Garcia Lorca
64000 Pau
France
tél: +33 (0)5 59 84 43 60
fax: +33 (0)5 59 84 43 58
www.tsfi.org
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