# CYBER RESILIENCE AND AWARENESS FOR SOCIETY FOSTERING COLLABORATION WITH ITU




**MAMELLO THINYANE** WITH DEBORA CHRISTINE AND CHRISTY UN

CYBERSECURITY POST-FORUM SESSION (DAY 3)

ITU Regional Development Forum Asia-Pacific

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UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY Institute in Macau



# WHY CONSIDER CIVIL SOCIETY FOR NATIONAL CYBER RESILIENCE?

- Resilie require
- Multi-dimensionality of cyber resilience
- Import active
- Increasing cyber risks to individuals and communities
- People are the key attack surface and vector
- Curren difficu

- Resilience is a systemic attribute and
  - requires whole-of-society approach
- Important responsibility of civil society as
  - active cybersecurity agents

- Current cybersecurity frameworks are
  - difficult to operationalize for civil society

# PREPARE

Awareness-raising Capacity-building **Redundancy measures Recovery plan** Logging and monitoring **Prevention measures Active mediation** Web hygiene **Attitudinal measures** 

# ABSORB

Alternative resources Withstand measures Incident reporting Threat removal measure Sandboxing and isolation Engage measures


# RECOVER

System recovery **Account recover** Data recovery **Professional support** Social support

# **ADAPT**

**Evolve measures** System upgrades **Resource swapout Bounce forward** Enhanced

#### More information:



# TO WHAT EXTENT DO NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGIES INCORPORATE CIVIL SOCIETY CYBER RESILENCE?

IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

# **GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY** INDEX

# **HUMAN DEVELOPMENT** INDEX

#### MEDIUM

Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Samoa

Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, Japan, South Korea, China, New Zealand, India

HIGH

Afghanistan, Vanuatu

LOW

Philippines, Samoa, China, Sri Lanka

# HIGH

LOW

Afghanistan

#### **VERY HIGH**

Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand

### MEDIUM

Vanuatu, India, Bangladesh

# **INCLUSION OF CYBER RESILIENCE THINKING IN THE STRATEGIES**

### **USE OF "RESILIENCE"** TERMINOLOGY

- Most countries use the term resilience in the strategies, but few elaborate on operationalization of resilience
- Others do not use the term "resilience" but include strategies for building resilient systems and ensuring business continuity

# **RESILIENCE AS A GOAL**

- Some countries identify secure and resilience environment as a strategic goal in the NCS

### SPECIFIC CASES

- Singapore and Philippines have very elaborate incorporation of cyber resilience into the NCS
- They define resilient state of cyberspace,
  - and the norms, procedures, processes and practices that it comprises

# **WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY POSTURING IN THE STRATEGIES**

### **CYBER RISKS IDENTIFIED**

- Several countries identify the role of • All countries identify not only state-level and entity-level cyber risks, they also note community-level stakeholders • Third-sector organizations encouraged to individual-level risks (e.g., identify theft) • People are identified as one of the participate in:
- important attack surfaces

# **ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

- information sharing,
- outreach activities,
- evaluating cybercrime law (e.g.,
  - Bangladesh)
- joining national CERT (e.g., New
  - Zealand)
- joining national cybersecurity steering committee (e.g., Vanuatu)

# WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY POSTURING IN THE STRATEGIES

PUBLIC COMMUNICATION	CAPA
<ul> <li>All countries use diverse programs and</li> </ul>	• Coun
materials to raise awareness on	for bu
cybersecurity risks	o pr
<ul> <li>Singapore adopts an advanced public</li> </ul>	in
outreach approach and draws on	° ec
behavioral insights to nudge good cyber	CC
hygiene practice in the general public	° CE
	pr

### CITY BUILDING

- ntries adopt a variety of approaches
- ouilding cyber capacity in citizens:
- rofessional training programs
- ncluding sector-specific training
- ducational programs run in schools,
- olleges and universities
- ertification and accreditation for
- rofessionals

# **WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY POSTURING IN THE STRATEGIES**

CITIZEN CO-PRODUCTION OF CYBERSECURITY	PROT GROU
	• Seve
<ul> <li>Few countries mention specific tools or</li> </ul>	ρορι
platforms to facilitate citizen's	vulne
participation in cybersecurity	• C
<ul> <li>Australia, New Zealand and Singapore have</li> </ul>	0 W
"hotlines" for reporting adverse cyber	∘ to
events	∘ e

• Specific mechanisms to empower the


• child online protection (e.g.,

### ECTION OF VULNERABLE JPS

- eral countries identify specific
- ulation groups and sectors that are
- erable to cyber attacks
- hildren and young people
- omen
- ourism sector (e.g., Samoa)
- Iderly (e.g., Sri Lanka)
- rural communities
- vulnerable
  - Afghanistan, Samoa, Vanuatu, China)
- outreach programs

# **KEY FINDINGS:**

The full report available at https://collections.unu.edu/view/UNU:7760



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- Several countries include resilience thinking in their strategies • Few countries give elaborate framing and operationalization of cyber resilience • All countries acknowledge cyber security as a **shared duty** of all stakeholders • However there are limited avenues for

- Citizens largely framed as recipients of cyber security
- There is better engagement between
  - certain sectors e.g., government and
  - private sector

citizen co-production of cyber security

Going Jorward?

# **ITU STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK** 2020 - 2023**GOAL 3 "SUSTAINABILITY"**

"... manage emerging risks, challenges and opportunities resulting from the rapid growth of telecommunications / information and communication technologies ..."











#### NATIONAL SECURITY **STRATEGIES**

#### CAPACITY-BUILDING FOR CIVIL SOCIETY



#### **CYBER RESILIENCE** TOOLS

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