

O1 Problem Statement

Vulnerable to Hijacking due to Blind Spots in the Perimeter Security Model

Unauthorized Users

| Vall-to-Wall Perimeter Security Firewall, VPN, NAC, IPS...

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Malware-infected Terminal

with Inherent Vulnerabilities

A

Terminals without Antivirus


Hijacked Users

Ransomware

Counterfeit S/W

Antivirus-bypassing Malware

Terminals via Rogue Proxy and Router



IP Technology Suffers from a Lack of Actual Communication Terminal Identification "Blind Spots in Communication Control"

IP Data Packet Structures

MAC (Layer 2)

IP Header (Layer 3)


Protocol Header (Layer 4) Payload (Layer 7)

Struggle with Identifying Actual Terminals, Resulting in Surpassed Technical Improvement Limits and Thresholds

DDoS, Ransomware, Zero Day Attack, Session Hijacking, MITM, Information leakage···Many Security Incidents Involve "The Network"



How to Improve the Perimeter Security Model




The Zero Trust Model logically Separates Unauthorized and Authorized Communication Terminal




The Power of a Zero Trust Model to Control Telecommunication

In the Perimeter Security Model (AS-IS)



- Inability to Identify and Control Flows between Terminal and Destination
 - Identify Terminal and Destination by IP Address
 - Set Policies and Control based on IP Address
 - Requiring Massive Amounts of Log Recording and Analysis

In the Zero Trust Model (TO-BE)



- Identify and Control Flows between Terminal and Destination
 - Identify as Terminal, Users, S/W, IP Addresses, and Logical Units
- Set Policies and Control based on Flow
- Intuitive Flow-Driven Log Recording and Analysis Scheme



Zero Trust Mechanisms

In the Perimeter Security Model

A Paradiam Shift in the Perimeter Security Model

In the Zero Trust Model

Untrusted


Unidentified Terminal



Beware of unidentified devices, users, and malware or ransomware infections.

Minimal Trust

Terminal and User



User authentication and basic verification

Verify security compliance, including device and user authentication and anti-virus software installation.

Partial Trust

S/W

Detection of network access Inspection of S/W

Identifying and inspecting substantial communications and verify access permissions


Temporary Trust


S/W ↔ Service Access



Allow communication after minimal authorization **Always-on inspection**

Allowed terminal can communicate temporarily with granted connection






Protection **Destination with** Minimal Damage

Zero Trust doesn't guarantee 100% safety, but it offers a foundational framework to minimize damage and proactively respond to emerging risks.




Zero Trust Architecture Implementation Elements

(Based on the Zero Trust Demonstration Model 'NIST SP 1800-35', Component Flowchart)



Elements of implementing the 7 Tenets of Zero Trust

6. All Resource Authentication and Authorization are Dynamic and Strictly Enforced before Access is Allowed





Technology verified by a public authority

Demonstrated Improvement by Applying Our Model (Solving the problems of the perimeter security model)



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
ructure design strategy for securing remote work in network

*Department of Computer Engineering, Daegu University **Annex Research Institute, Forwiz System Co.LTD

이상 안전성을 제공하지 못한다. 이러한 문제점을 해결하기 위해 네트워크 방문리를 구축한 국내의 많은 기관은 재택근무의 보안성을 향상시키기 위해 VDI서비 기반의 환경을 구축 및 사용하고 있다. 그러나 VDI서비는 망점점 생성, VM의 약성코드 감염 및 전화, VM 우회 공격 등 지탱적인 취약점을 갖고 있어 이에 대한 대회이 결심적 요구된다. 본 논문에서는 VDI서비의 안전을 위해 Zero-Trust기반의 구조 및 서비스 절자를 제안하고 VDI서비에서 발생 가능한 취약점 및 위험에 대한 방어가 가능함을

L 서운

3200년 일반이 설명로 COVID-18에 취하는
5 개설 로 기에서 20 시원 기계 및 18 시원 기계



Perimeter Security Model **Experimental Environment**

The paper proposes a secure VDI system based on Zero Trust. We have verified through experiments that it can tackle various security threats arising from remote work. By managing access between virtual machines using Local PEP and PDP Controllers, we were able to prevent malware propagation and permission bypass through virtual machines. The structure proposed in this paper demonstrates an alternative for a safer remote work environment. (Excerpt from the paper)

> Prof. Chang Hoon Kim's research team at Daegu University KIISC, Winning the Best Paper Award in Autumn(2021)

posco INTERNATIONAL • As a global conglomerate, they need to be able to access our business systems anytime, anywhere – from home, smart offices, and domestic and international business trips.

 About 5,000 employees of more than 80 corporations around the world worked based on the 24/7 Zero Trust model, and work satisfaction improved.

Control Blind Spots that Perimeter Security Models Were Unable to Identify

Identify Communication Terminal S/W

137 Cases

Identify Communicable Protected Services

1,350 Cases

Perimeter Security Models Cannot Identify Communication Flows and Block Communication Requests (2020~2021)

Identify Requests from All Users, Devices, and S/W

2.2 Million Cases

Block Communication for Potential Risk (71%)

1.56 Million Cases

Request **Acceptance Criteria** Enforce security compliance, Inspect Communication S/W, verify policies for allowing access to protected services, etc.

Blocking **Analysis Results**

Bypass non-business S/W and antiviruses and check for ransomware and malware blocking port scanning

Based on the Results Applied to the Real Environment, It is the Only One in Korea to Derive Quantitative Effects



O3 Demonstrating a Zero Trust Model In Korea (Ministry of Science and ICT)

Objectives

A Globally-focused Zero Trust Model

Next-Generation
Communications Experiences

Secure Wireless Networks and Validate Cloud-based Next-Generation Communications Control Infrastructure

Communications Infrastructure Centered Zero Trust Model

Work From Anywhere

Enable Public Cloud and On-Premises Work Environments that Comply with Korea's Specialized Security Regulations

Build a Cloud-centric Service and Work Environment

National Security Governance The Security Governance Scheme that Enables Incremental Implementation of the Maturity Model by Integrates SBoM and Existing Security Models

Combine Various Security Models for Flexible Scalability

Demonstration with National Critical Facilities



Korea's Major Wired and Wireless Service Company NIA 한국지능정보사회진흥원 Organizations Working on Digital Platform Government Projects HF 한국주택금융공사

FSC-affiliated Organizations that Provide Housing Guarantees and Loans


Serious National Losses Occur due to Cyber Attacks



Demonstrating a Zero Trust Model In Korea (Ministry of Science and ICT)

Demonstrate the Next Generation of Zero Trust Telecommunications





Decide Whether to Allow within 100 msec

Unified Relaying of S/W and L2/3/4/7 (Trusted Connection)

Policy Decision Point (PDP)

Enable Immediately without Policy Settings (Zero Touch Configuration)

Communication Information Collection and Real-time Analytics

Policy Information Points (PIPs)

API-based Extension Scheme Connecting the Wired and Wireless Cores

Transcend the Physical boundaries

Wired Network Infrastructure ★ Wireless Network Infrastructure


Private Network Infrastructure

(LG유플러스

NIA 한국지능정보사회진흥원

HF 한국주택금융공사

Secure Connection Relay Even on Untrusted Networks



SDP (Software Defined

Perimeter)

Establishing OS-level Micro-perimeters with S/W Installation

Pre-Authentication and Post-Access Mechanisms

Support for Multiple OS

(Windows, Mac OS, Gooroom OS, Android, iOS, Linux, etc.)

Addressing Vulnerabilities in Open Source SDP

Micro-Segmentation (Network Level)

Control communication between:

Security-compliant Terminals and IoT Devices and Services

Authorized S/W and Services

SaaS, DaaS, VDI, and Managed Servers for Privileged Users

EIG (Enhanced

Identity

Governance)

One ID Authentication with Public Sector User Information Integration

Anti Phising FIDO Authentication

Trusted Connection for Communication Identification

> Isolate Risky Communication Terminals

Establish Access to Centralized Public SaaS, Features, and Data

User Authentication with FIDO Before Network Access

Troubleshoot Session Hijacking by Not Exposing ID

Continuous Authentication with Compliance and Behavioral Analytics

Micro-Segmentation (Service Level) Control Access to:

Standard Protocolbased Services from Authorized Terminal

In-service Capabilities of Authorized Terminal

In-service Data of Authorized Terminal

PRIBIT

Please question to email below

benjamin@pribit.com

PRIBIT

Thank you