Measuring the Security of Machine Learning models

Giovanni Cherubin @gchers

ITU/WHO Workshop on AI for Health 22 January, 2019





• Predict risk of diseases or events (e.g., heart attacks)


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
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
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



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
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




• Models patterns in data




- Models patterns in data
- Allows automation, reducing costs





- Models patterns in data
- Allows automation, reducing costs
- Scales better than humans




Private data

































Model Inversion [F+'15]








Model Inversion [F+'15]



tion Likely to develop tuberculosis dence 64%

Model Inversion [F+'15]



Desiderata

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
Measure if/how much private data an ML model reveals before deployment


Desiderata

- Measure if/how much private data an ML model reveals before deployment
- No need to understand what's inside


Desiderata


- Measure if/how much private data an ML model reveals before deployment
- No need to understand what's inside
- Mathematical guarantees

















Basic idea: Estimate the probability of success of an optimal adversary from data













Adversarial learning









TL;DL

- ML models may reveal information about their private training data
- Before releasing them, we need to measure how much information they leak
- Black-box security techniques allow this, without the need to understand how the models work
- There's more: adversarial learning

Background

https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2018/artificial-intelligence-summit/en

"Model inversion attacks that exploit confidence information and basic countermeasures" (M. Fredrikson, S. Jha, T. Ristenpart, 2015)

"Membership inference attacks against machine learning models" (R. Shokri, M. Stronati, C. Song, V. Shmatikov, 2017)

Measuring security

"Statistical measurement of information leakage." (K. Chatzikokolakis, T. Chothia, G. Apratim, 2010)

"Bayes, not Naïve: Security Bounds on Website Fingerprinting Defenses" (G. Cherubin, 2017)

"F-BLEAU: Practical Channel Leakage Estimation" (G. Cherubin, K. <u>Chatzikokolakis</u>, C. <u>Palamidessi</u>, 2019) [Under submission]

More https://giocher.com/pages/bayes.html

Code https://github.com/gchers/fbleau

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




Black-box security




Black-box security





Estimate: Pr(s ≠ ŝ) where ŝ is the prediction of optimal adversary (Bayes adversary)







[CH'67]








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