VULNERABILITY OF RADAR PROTOCOL AND PROPOSED MITIGATION





ABOUT US






- OWe are an investigation group from Córdoba, Argentina.
- OEduardo Casanovas is an Electronic Engineer, Telecommunications Specialist, Cryptography and Teleinformatic-Security Specialist, Master in Telecommunications- Engineering- Science. Also, he is a graduate teacher in IUA.
- OTomás Buchaillot and Facundo Baigorria are System Analysts and University Technicia in Programming. They are finishing their Software Engineer degree.
- OEduardo is actually the thesis project's tutor for Tomas and Facundo. This paper is based on our thesis project.



THE PROBLEM



- OThe radar system is extremely important and each government **MUST** ensure the safety of passengers and the efficiency of the system.
- ONowadays, the data traffic between the radars and the operation center of the airports **IS NOT SAFE**.
- OIn this presentation we are going to show you the problem in this data protocol —ASTERIX-, a simulation of an attack and a proposed mitigation.



ASTERIX



- O All Purpose STructured Eurocontrol SuRveillance Information Exchange.
- OStandard protocol designed to exchange data between radar sensors and the control centers through means of a message structure.
- OHas been developed bit by bit to provide and optimize surveillance information exchange inside and between countries which makes the aerial traffic control centers (ATC) ASTERIX's main users.

ASTERIX - Structure



OData Categories

OUser Application Profile

OData Item


OData Block

OData Field

ORegisters


ASTERIX - Structure





ASTERIX - FSPEC





- Category 048




first record last record

where:

- Data Category (CAT) = 048, is a one-octet field indicating that the Data Block contains radar target reports;
- Length Indicator (LEN) is a two-octet field indicating the total length in octets of the Data Block, including the CAT and LEN fields;
- FSPEC is the Field Specification.

ASTERIX - Category 048






Data Item	Data Item Description	Length in Octets
1048/140	Time-of-Day	3
1048/020	Target Report Descriptor	1+
1048/040	Measured Position in Slant Polar Coordinates	4
1048/090	Flight Level in Binary Representation	2
1048/130	Radar Plot Characteristics	1+1+
n.a.	Field Extension Indicator	n.a.
1048/220	Aircraft Address	3
1048/250	Mode S MB Data	1+8*n
1048/161	Track Number	2
1048/042	Calculated Position in Cartesian Coordinates	4
1048/200	Calculated Track Velocity in Polar Representation	4
1048/170	Track Status	1+
n.a.	Field Extension Indicator	n.a.
1048/210	Track Quality	4

M an in the M iddle



- O Gives the attacker the possibility to read, insert, drop and modify the packets.
- O ARP Poisoning technique.



M an in - Applied to iddle ERIX



OSince all the ASTERIX data travels **unencrypted**, we just need to get into an airport network the make the attack.


That is **scary**.

OWe developed a software which captures all the packets between two nodes (Radar and Operation Center) and manipulates them. In order to do that, the software creates a virtual interface in which all the packages go trough.

OThis software receives three options: BLOCK, ADD and MOD. With these options, we can delete the aircraft's information, modify the route of the airplanes or even add new airplanes in the system. In other words, we own all the radar traffic.

NETWORK SIMULATION






Router

For sineusinteulation dan, the operation a In this esection rested avalopair plane data, software we never educated the Cear part eserce the corden each take Ith Raxing ar league and flight simulator, content the them ERIX graphits radar.



FLIGHTGEAR





It is a multiplatform open-sourced flight simulator.

We use this software with the purpose of obtaining real-time aircraft data.

FLIGHTGEAR

- XML File




```
<PropertyList>
<generic>
   <output>
       <line separator>;</line separator>
                                                 FlightGear has a system which can obtain real
       <var separator>;</var separator>
       <binary mode>false/binary mode>
                                                 time aircraft data through a XML file.
       <chunk>
           <name>longitude</name>
           <type>float</type>
                                                 Doing so, we set the necessary data and we send
           <format>%03.5f</format>
           <node>/position/longitude-deg</node> them to a specific AGIUA port.
       </chunk>
       <chunk>
           <name>latitude</name>
           <type>float</type>
           <format>%03.5f</format>
           <node>/position/latitude-deg</node>
       </chunk>
       zchunks.
```

AGIUA — Radar Simulator



AGIUA (Asterix Generator IUA) takes the data from a specific port and creates with it ASTERIX packets and sends them trough the network.




As for now, AGIUA can only create category 48, 32, 1 and 2 packets.

Operation Center Simulator




This software receives the ASTERIX packets and puts them in a queue. After that, the software creates threads that decode these packets and send them to



a graphical interface. This GUI, has 2 radars: a radar in which we can see the normal route of the planes and a hacked radar in which we see the attacks.

ATTACK SIMULATION





MITMAST





MITMAST (Man In The Middle ASTerix) is a software which makes the ARP Poisoning attack and modifies the ASTERIX blocks of the packages depending on the given option.

We have 3 options:


```
Archivo Editar Ver Terminal Ir Ayuda
[root@MITM Mitm-master]# ./mitm -i eth0 -t 192.168.1.200 192.168.1.201 -t
Created tap interface mitm0
Attacker is at 00:50:56:20:CC:6B
192.168.1.200 is at 00:50:56:25:07:C1
192.168.1.201 is at 00:50:56:25:07:C2
Tom is in the middle (Press escape to exit)
14 packets sniffed
Shutdowning, please wait
Cleaning up ARP tables
[root@MITM Mitm-master]# ./mitm -i eth0 -t 192.168.1.200 192.168.1.201 -t -o BLOCK
Aircraft Adress: 49d0a9
 ** AA : 49d0a9 **Created tap interface mitm0
Attacker is at 00:50:56:20:CC:6B
192.168.1.200 is at 00:50:56:25:07:C1
192.168.1.201 is at 00:50:56:25:07:C2
Tom is in the middle (Press escape to exit)
39 aircrafts blocked
Shutdowning, please wait
Cleaning up ARP tables
[root@MITM Mitm-master]#
```

MODEK

With this option, we can addition and the tag at it through the contained in each ASTERIX packet.


MitM - Sniff Command





MitM - BLOCK Command






MitM - ADD Command







MitM - MOD Command




Terminal - tomuz@MITM:/home/tomuz/dev/Mitm-master	+ _ E X				
Archivo Editar Ver Terminal Ir Ayuda					
[root@MITM Mitm-master]# ./mitm -i eth0 -t 192.168.1.200 192.168.1.201 -t					
Created tap interface mitm0 Attacker is at 00.50.56.20.CC.6B Comando para modificar la					
Attacker is at 00:50:56:20:CC:6B 192.168.1.200 is at 00:50:56:25:07:C1					
192.168.1.201 is at 00:50:56:25:07:C2	•••				
Tom is in the middle (Press escape to exit)					
61 packets sniffed					
Shutdowning, please wait					
[root@MITM Mitm-master]# ./mitm -i eth0 -t 192.168.1.200 192.168.1.201 -t	-o MOD				
[100t@iliiii ilidater]# ./ilitii					
Aircraft Adress: 49d0a9 Dirección del avion a ser modificado					
X hacia donde debe ir el avion :10					
Coordenadas de destino					
Y hacia donde debe ir el avion:10 dentro del radar					
Attacker is at 00.50.56.20.00.6B					
Attacker is at 00:50:56:20:CC:6B 192.168.1.200 is at 00:50:56:25:07:C1					
192.168.1.201 is at 00:50:56:25:07:C2					
Tom is in the middle (Press escape to exit)					
4 aircrafts modified Cantidad de paquetes modificados					
	I				

MitM - Attack








MitM - Attack






MitM - Attack








MitM -Sniff Demonstration








MitM -BLOCK Demonstration








MitM -ADD Demonstration








MitM -MOD Demonstration







MITIGATION



ASTERIX does not have any security mechanism of its own. This leads us to cover the following aspects.

kets Modification

The attackers is able to sperform an MiTM which allows little modify the packets. The attacker is able to shift the network data traffic and also save it and try to inject it Possible mitigation: in another moment

Encryption of the most critical data fields, for instance the aircraft ID, the aircraft address and its Validation of the packets integrity using hash functions.

Possible mitigation:

position.

Validation of the packets integrity using HMAC functions.

Encrypt each packet elimestam pechniques suggest the use of AEAD algorythms (Authenticated)

Encryption with Associated Data) because of their confidentiality, integrity and authentication.

MITIGATION

Performance And Efficiency



- O It is very important that any of the security measures used does not impair the system's performance.
- O Based on our tests we can demonstrate that with the latest processing power we can achieve the incorporation of these security measures without impairing the normal flow of sent and recieved packages from the operation center

CONCLUSION



- O ASTERIX protocol is vulnerable.
- O An attack like the one shown before can bring huge monetary or lives lost in any country.
- O With an encryptation mechanisim this problem can be solved.



Questions Time

Thank you! Have a good flight home!

ITU Kaleidoscope 2015 Barcelona, Spain Casanovas – Baigorria – Buchaillot



