

Wi-Trust

*Improving Wi-Fi Hotspot Trustworthiness
with Computational Trust Management*

Jean-Marc.Seigneur@reputation.com



**UNIVERSITÉ
DE GENÈVE**

Reputation

Agenda

- Hotspots Security and Remaining Threats
- Computational Trust Management
- Wi-Trust, our new proposal to promote trustworthy hotspots easily on top of Hotspot 2.0
- Q&A


Legacy Hotspots Remaining Security Holes

- Issues
 - Eavesdropping on unencrypted Wi-Fi
 - Legitimate hotspot spoofing
 - Session hi-jacking
 - Legal liability of the Wi-Fi hotspot sharer in several countries
- Failed workarounds
 - WPA2-Enterprise technology cannot be applied to legacy Wi-Fi hotspot networks because the access point's 802.1X port blocks all communications prior to authentication
 - 802.1X client-side software and user credentials configuration too difficult on large-scale
 - Most users do not know or want to pay for a VPN

Hotspot 2.0


- Advances
 - Over-the-air encrypted transmissions with Certified WPA2-Enterprise
 - Granting access to the network based upon credentials
 - such as SIM cards, based on EAP
 - without user intervention, even when Wi-Fi roaming between trusted providers
 - Selecting Wi-Fi networks based on user preferences and network optimisation
- Remaining issues
 - Eavesdropping at the hotspot after encryption between client and hotspot
 - Malicious hotspot owner, only Wi-Fi service provider is authenticated
 - Compromised legitimate hotspot
 - Untrustworthy provider providing low QoS

Computational Trust Management



- Previous work applied to Wi-Fi trust required too many changes at the hotspot firmware level

Wi-Trust Overview



- Easier to deploy on a large-scale
 - Trust engine ER mapped to Hotspot 2.0 EAP
 - Hotspot 2.0 ANQP available extra elements to communicate trust in providers, clients and potentially hotspots communicated

Features Comparison

	Legacy Hotspot	Hotspot 2.0	Wi-Trust
Wi-Fi roaming authentication without initial manual intervention		*	*
Client/Hotspot encryption against eavesdropping		*	*
Strong authentication of the hotspot service provider and user client		*	*
Automated hotspot selection	*	*	*
Automated hotspot selection based on computational trust in hotspots and service providers			*
Hotspot owner legal liability mitigation by malicious user client exclusion based on computational trust			*



Q&A

Jean-Marc.Seigneur@reputation.com



**UNIVERSITÉ
DE GENÈVE**

Reputation