



KASPERSKY AUTOMOTIVE SECURITY

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CONNECTED CAR EVOLUTION

Non connected
car

PAST

Connected
devices, GPS,
Internet


YESTEDAY

Cloud Services,
Remote
assistance


TODAY

Autonomous car,
complete remote
control


FUTURE



CONNECTED CAR EVOLUTION. Benefits



CONNECTED CAR EVOLUTION. Benefits and **Cyber Risks**



CONNECTED CAR TROJAN



Mobile apps and stealing a connected car

By [Mikhail Kuzin](#), [Victor Chebyshev](#) on February 16, 2017. 10:27 pm

PUBLICATIONS

CONNECTED CAR

INTERNET OF THINGS

MOBILE ATTACKS

SMS TROJAN

SOCIAL ENGINEERING

CONTENTS >>

The concept of a connected car, or a car equipped with Internet access, has been gaining popularity for the last several years. The case in point is not only multimedia systems (music, maps, and films are available on-board in modern luxury cars) but also car key systems in both literal and figurative senses. By using proprietary mobile apps, it is possible to get the GPS coordinates of a car, trace its route, open its doors, start its engine, and turn on its auxiliary devices. On the one hand, these are absolutely useful features used by millions of people, but on the other hand, if a car thief were to gain access to the mobile device that belongs to a victim that has the app installed, then would car theft not become a mere trifle?

In pursuing the answer to this question, we decided to figure out what an evildoer can do and how car owners can avoid possible predicaments related to this issue.



CONNECTED CAR MAIN SECURITY OBJECTIVES

Protect Communications

Physical and remote connections

Protect Cloud Services

OTA updates and Management



Safety


Protect Each Module

All ECU, Sensors, BCU


Persist Advanced Threats

Analytics and Analysis


CONNECTED CAR MAIN INTERNAL VULNERABLE POINTS



POTENTIAL THREAT VECTORS




CONNECTED CAR SECURITY LAYERS



Layers	Threat vectors
Car Cloud Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Man in-The-Middle-Attack • Attack From Downloaded Apps
NW Access	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sniffing of User Data • Attack From Downloaded Apps • Exploiting Software Vulnerabilities
Car Gateway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attack from Apps in Mobile Device • Exploiting SW Vulnerabilities • Malicious Firmware Update • Malware Delivery Thru Data Storage Devices
Car Network	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compromised Engine Actuator • Attack on Vehicle Bus
Car ECU, IVI, OBD2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attack on Key, • Malicious Firmware Update • Attack on Vehicle Bus

CONNECTED CAR SAFETY THRU SECURITY



HOW WE WORK

Threat model

- Define security objectives
- Create detailed description of scenarios, with results of misuse/abuse cases identification
- Threat modelling
- Define high-level security requirements
- Create a security-focused system architectural concept
- Refine threat model and security requirements

Architecture

- Specify system requirements for the security features
- Create test plans and test cases for the security features
- Design architecture
- Create low-level design

Development & testing

- Development and testing
- Residual risks assessment
- Integration with HW and testing
- Creation of instrumentation
- Final testing and residual risk assessment
- Penetration testing (separate dedicated team)

Security ~~vs~~ Safety

Security for Safety

KASPERSKY LAB AUTOMOTIVE SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES

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