INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATION
UNION
Council
2000
Report
by the Secretary-General
Management
of Internet Domain Names and Addresses
Comprehensive
Version — Part II
of Council Document C2000/27-E
Table
of Contents
1.
Background
2.
ICANN
2.1.
ICANN’s Structure
2.1.1.
Board of Directors
2.1.2.
Supporting
Organizations
2.1.3.
Advisory Committees
2.2.
Accreditation of Registrars
2.3.
NSI’s Recognition of ICANN
2.4.
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Framework
3.
New Top Level Domain
s
3.1.
Geopolitical Top Level Domains
3.1.1.
Allocation of Top Level Domain for ISO 3166 “Occupied Palestinian
Territory”
3.1.2.
Proposed European Union Top Level Domain “.eu”
3.2.
Proposed New Generic Top Level Domains
4.
ICANN Role Issues
4.1.
US Government Contractual Relationship with NSI and ICANN
4.2.
General Accounting Office Review
4.3.
Management of the Authoritative Root Server
4.4.
US Anti-Cybersquatting Legislation
5.
ITU
Activities Related to ICANN
5.1.
The Governmental Advisory Committee
5.2.
Protocol Supporting Organization
5.3.
.INT Top Level Domain Management
5.4.
Protection of the ITU’s Names and Acronyms in gTLDs
6.
Conclusions
Since the adoption of Resolution
102 on “Management of Internet Domain Names and Addresses”
(Minneapolis, 1998)[i],
and the ITU activities described last year in Council Document C99/51,[ii]
significant debate continues on the evolution and management of the
Internet Domain Name System (“DNS”). In particular, international
policy development related to the introduction of competition,
intellectual property dispute resolution, and the addition of new
top-level domains continues to be the catalyst of change. This has led to
significant changes in Internet administration activities and increased
governmental attention.
This problem, in Internet terms,
has had a long and contentious history. The decisions defining the current
set of top level domains were essentially made in the mid-1980s, when the
Internet was a relatively small research and education network closed to
commercial uses. However, as the Internet was increasingly commercialized in the early 1990s, the forces
of business supply and demand — and intellectual property, explicitly
trademarks — began to have a major impact on the DNS. This has primarily
had an effect on “generic” top level domains (“gTLDs”)
[iii],
such as .com, .net, and .org, representing the largest percentage of
global DNS registrations. It also has had a growing influence on the 244
country code top level domains (“ccTLDs”), such as .be for Belgium, .mx
for Mexico, and .cn for the People’s Republic of China.[iv]
Since 1993, originally through a
“cooperative agreement”[v]
with the US National Science Foundation (“NSF”), gTLDs have been
managed by Network Solutions Incorporated (“NSI”)[vi]
of Herndon, Virginia, USA. In the early 1990’s, NSF and NSI were
struggling with the growth of domain name registrations.[vii]
NSF reacted to this in 1995 by allowing NSI to institute a US$ 50 a year
fee for gTLD domain name registrations[viii]
— later lowered to US$ 35 a year.[ix]
As of May 2000, there are more than 14 million active domain name
registrations under NSI-managed gTLDs.[x]
In the mid-1990’s, there was
considerable dissatisfaction with what was perceived to be a monopoly in
gTLD registration services. Reacting to this, the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (“IANA”),[xi]
historically recognized by the Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”)
and others as having DNS oversight, tabled several proposals to introduce
competition. These proposals were initially based on parties administering
new gTLDs, like NSI, at both the registry (back-end database) and
registrar (customer interface) level.
From a technical standpoint,
adding new gTLDs is not complicated. However, it raises some very complex
international public policy questions:[xii]
§
Who controls the Internet root server
system?
§
Who has policy authority to add names to
the Internet root server system?
§
How many new gTLDs should be or could be
added?
§
What names should be added?
§
How does one decide who gets to
administer a new gTLD?
§
What is the economic and contractual
relationship between the central registry and multiple registrars?
§
Should registrations be open to anyone or
be restricted to special communities?
The relation between domain name
registrations and trademark rights made the issue of new gTLDs even more
contentious, as many trademark owners opposed the addition of any
new gTLDs until regulatory mechanisms or dispute resolutions mechanisms
were put into place to link domain name registrations to trademark
protection.
In 1996, representatives from the
Internet Society, IANA, the Internet Architecture Board (“IAB”)[xiii],
the US Federal Networking Council (“FNC”),[xiv]
the ITU, the International Trademark Association[xv],
and the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”)[xvi]
formed the International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC),[xvii]
in an attempt to address a major evolution of the DNS. In early 1997, the
IAHC released its report on “Recommendations for Administration and
Management of gTLDs”.[xviii]
The plan proposed, what was then, radical new concepts. For example, gTLDs
would be “shared” among globally-distributed competing registrars[xix]
and a new uniform dispute resolution process would be designed to deal
with intellectual property conflicts with domain names.[xx]
Perhaps even more importantly, the valuable registry function would be
contracted out to a non-competing neutral operator by a consortium of gTLD
registrars.
The contours of this plan were
defined in an instrument called the Generic Top Level Domain Memorandum of
Understanding (“gTLD-MoU”)[xxi] for which ITU acted as
depository to signatories. Reacting to debate surrounding this ambitious
plan, the US government released a “Green Paper” in January 1998
outlining a “Proposed Rule” where the US Department of Commerce
(“DOC”) would itself license five new Internet top level domain
registries. Following public comment, the US government issued a “White
Paper”[xxii]
or “Statement of Policy” in June 1998 that backed away from
“substantive regulatory provisions” and defined broad principles and
procedures that it would use to transition “from its existing management
role” to a “new non-profit corporation”.
The White Paper required that this new
corporation be incorporated in the United States.[xxiii]
Several months
later, in October 1998, the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”[xxiv]),
a California-based non-profit corporation was formed (according to its web
site) “to assume responsibility for the IP address space allocation,
protocol parameter assignment, domain name system management, and root
server system management functions previously performed under U.S.
Government contract by IANA and other entities”.[xxv]
In October 1998, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (“IANA”) made
a submission[xxvi] on behalf of ICANN that
it be recognized as the new corporation discussed in the White Paper.[xxvii]
The following month, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the
US Department of Commerce and ICANN.[xxviii]
In February 1999, ICANN was designated to NSI (by DOC) as the new
corporation described in the White Paper (with the qualifier “for
certain purposes”).[xxix]
Since its creation, ICANN has been
active on several fronts. The first was establishing its decision-making
procedures and recognizing its “supporting organizations”. The second
was accrediting new registrars who would offer registrations in NSI’s
new Shared Registration System for the existing gTLDs: .com, .net, and .org.[xxx]
The third was finalizing a dispute resolution framework to process and
resolve disputes over domain names. The fourth was developing contractual
relations with NSI who originally would not recognize its oversight. These
issues are briefly discussed below.
ICANN has a general structure
comprised of a “Board of Directors”, “Supporting Organizations”,
and “Advisory Committees”, as discussed below. A graphic representing
ICANN’s structure can be found on the ICANN web site.[xxxi]
ITU’s particular role in the ICANN structure is discussed in Section
5
.
The ICANN Board of Directors (“BoD”)
has nineteen seats. Nine “at-large” directors are to be elected by an
as yet unfinalized process involving ICANN’s planned “general
membership”.[xxxii]
Three “Supporting Organizations” have already selected another nine
directors. An ex-officio President/CEO also sits on the Board.
ICANN’s initial set of directors plan to leave within the 2000/2001 time
frame.
According to
ICANN, the definition of its three Supporting Organizations are:
[xxxiii]
- the
Address Supporting Organization[xxxiv]
(“ASO”): concerned with the system of IP addresses, (e.g.,
128.9.128.127), that uniquely identify the Internet’s networked
computers.
- the
Domain Name Supporting Organization[xxxv]
(“DNSO”): concerned with the Internet DNS, the system of names
commonly used to identify Internet locations and resources.
- the
Protocol Supporting Organization[xxxvi]
(“PSO”): concerned with the assignment of unique parameters for
Internet protocols, the technical standards that let computers
exchange information and manage communications over the Internet (see
Section
5.2
for discussion concerning ITU’s role in the PSO).
The ICANN Structure also provides
for “Advisory Committees”.[xxxvii]
There are currently four of these including a Governmental Advisory
Committee (“GAC”) open to all national governments. GAC membership is
also open to “Distinct Economies” as recognized in international fora,
and multinational governmental organizations and treaty organizations, at
the invitation of the GAC Chair, or at the invitation of the ICANN BoD.[xxxviii]
For discussion of the GAC and ITU’s role, see Section 5.1
.
The Shared Registration System
(“SRS”) is a domain name registration system for competing registrars
in the .com, .net, and .org top level domains. The SRS was created in the
spring of 1999 through an initiative of the United States Department of
Commerce under an amendment to its cooperative agreement with NSI. Under
this shared registration system, competing ICANN-accredited registrars
register domain names utilizing one central registry maintained by NSI.[xxxix]
For each registration, NSI is payed a fixed fee for each domain name
registered by each registrar. As of May 2000, over one hundred registrars
have been accredited by ICANN.[xl]
The concept of “shared” gTLDs where there is a division between
“registry” functions performing back-end database functions and
“registrar” functions that deals directly with customers was initially
proposed by the IAHC in 1997. At that time, NSI had rejected the concept
saying that it was “unworkable.”[xli]
Following differences of opinion
concerning NSI’s recognition of ICANN, a complex set of contractual
agreements was negotiated that involved NSI, DOC and ICANN.[xlii]
The key provisions set forth in this agreement include:
- NSI
recognized ICANN and agrees to operate the .com, .org and .net
registries in accordance to a Registry Agreement between ICANN and NSI
and future “consensus policies” adopted by ICANN;
- NSI
agreed to become an ICANN accredited registrar for the .com, .org, and
.net domains;
- NSI
agreed to participate in the funding of ICANN through registry and
registrar fees.
A fact sheet on the ICANN web site
explains these agreements.[xliii]
A key part of the above agreement
is that NSI continues to operate the existing gTLD registry for .com,
.net, and .org and also act as a registrar. Their agreement with the US
government and ICANN lasts until at least November 10, 2003. In the
circumstance that NSI divests itself of either the registry or registrar
side of the business within 18 months of the original agreement date (in
other words, before April 10, 2001), the agreement is extended for another
four years until November 2007.[xliv]
Following the release of the US
government’s “White Paper”,[xlv]
the World Intellectual Property Organizations (“WIPO”) conducted an
Internet Domain Name Process that studied the relationship between
intellectual property and trademarks. WIPO delivered its Final Report to
ICANN[xlvi]
with recommendations for a uniform dispute resolution policy to be
followed by all gTLD registrars. After consultation with registrars and
several committees, ICANN staff prepared a Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (“UDRP”[xlvii]),
which was implemented in December 1999. As of May 2000, more than 850
proceedings[xlviii] involving disputes
over more than 1’200 domain names have been filed. The majority of cases
have resulted in the affected domain name being transferred to the
complainant.
ICANN’s UDRP is an iteration of
the unified dispute resolution framework proposed for gTLDs first
developed by the IAHC, also in cooperation with WIPO.[xlix]
Historically, all geopolitical top
level domains have been based on the two letter (“alpha-2”) code set
in the ISO 3166-1 Standard[l] (e.g., .fr for France, .cn
for the People’s Republic of China). Two significant developments vis-à-vis
geopolitical top level domains have taken place in the last year.
In March 2000, following the
designation in the ISO 3166 Standard of
“PS” as the two-letter code representing the ISO 3166-1
entitled “Occupied Palestinian Territory”, ICANN allocated the
corresponding Internet top level domain “.ps”.[li]
In February 2000,
the European Commission published a working paper on the potential
creation of a European Union-oriented top level domain “.eu”.[lii] A public consultation
process followed this. The responses,[liii]
along with an analysis,[liv]
are available on a Commission-related web site.
Currently, the allocation of .eu
would require a decision by both IANA/ICANN and the US Department of
Commerce (see Section
4.3
). As of May 2000, a formal request to ICANN to
allocate .eu has not been made. Allocation of .eu would create an unusual
precedent because “EU” is not officially part of the ISO 3166-1
standard but rather in an “exceptionally reserved” list of the ISO
3166 Maintenance Agency. Therefore, its allocation would contravene
current stated ICANN policy.[lv]
In April 2000, the DNSO management
body, the “Names Council”, made an imprecise recommendation on new
gTLDs that said: “a limited number of new top-level domains be
introduced initially and that the future introduction of additional
top-level domains be done only after careful evaluation of the initial
introduction”.[lvi]
ICANN’s BoD are expected to adopt a policy on introduction of new gTLDs
at its meeting in July 2000 in Yokohama, Japan.[lvii]
NSI has notably made a separate and more specific proposal to the
DNSO Names Council.[lviii]
In June 2000, ICANN released a project plan for introduction of new gTLDs
with a November 1, 2000 planned date for the announcement of new TLDs.[lix]
The US government indicated in the
White Paper its plan to withdraw from a DNS oversight role “in
no event later than September 30, 2000”.
However, in the NSI agreement with DOC that provides for its
recognition of ICANN (see Section
2.3
), the US government has a contractual relationship
with ICANN and NSI which lasts until at least November 10, 2003. In the
circumstance that NSI divests itself of either the registry or registrar
side of the business within 18 months of that date, this agreement extends
for another four years until November 2007.[lx]
This agreement provides for the possibility of ICANN’s authority being
terminated and DOC assuming policy-setting roles for the .com, .net and
.org registry services.[lxi]
Considering NSI’s still extremely dominant position, it is possible that
there will be further challenges to ICANN if and when further attempts to
devolve NSI’s position are made.
At the time of preparation of this
report (May 2000), the U.S. General Accounting Office (“GAO”)[lxii],
an investigative arm of the US Congress, is reviewing DOC’s role in its
relationship to ICANN and its related authority.[lxiii]
Its report is due at the end of June 2000. This is the latest in a series
of US Congressional enquiries and hearings related to the DNS, ICANN and
the Department of Commerce. It is unclear as to its significance. However,
it is notable that the GAO has been specifically requested to review
“whether the Department [of Commerce] has the legal authority to
transfer control of the authoritative root server
to ICANN” (see below, Section
4.3
)
Management control over the
authoritative root server represents considerable influence over the
Internet and DNS. The root server contains the master entries for all
Internet top level domains including gTLDs and ccTLDs. For example,
removal of a ccTLD from the authoritative root server would be
quasi-equivalent to disconnecting a country from the Internet.[lxiv]
In a fact sheet on the agreements
between ICANN, US DOC, and NSI discussed in Section
4.1
, the US DOC has indicated that: “The Department of
Commerce expects to receive a technical proposal from ICANN for management
of the authoritative root and this management responsibility may be
transferred to ICANN at some point in the future. The Department of
Commerce has no plans to transfer to any entity its policy authority to
direct the authoritative root server.”[lxv]
It is not clear how this last statement should be interpreted.
In November 1999, the US Anti-cybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) was signed into law. The US
Administration had opposed the anti-cybersquatting legislation because it
believed the domain name dispute resolution issues should be addressed in
ICANN. However, to make the bill veto-proof, the US Congress attached it
to two other pieces of desired legislation.
A particularly interesting
provision is that the US Congress, recognizing that millions of gTLD
domain holders are outside the United States, included a provision for an
“in rem” jurisdiction over the domain names of persons who are
not subject to jurisdiction of a US court. The relevant text says:
“(C) In
an in rem action under this paragraph, a domain name shall be deemed to
have its situs in the judicial district in which--
(i)
the domain name registrar, registry, or other domain name authority that
registered or assigned the domain name is located; or
(ii) documents sufficient
to establish control and authority regarding the disposition of the
registration and use of the domain name are deposited with the court.”
This means that based on the
location of the .com, .net, and .org registry in the United States, the
domain name of any non-US registrant in current gTLDs can be made subject
to a U.S. court. This has an interesting implication for future expansion
of DNS. For example, when a new gTLD registry is established outside the
United States (as recently proposed by NSI for .shop),
58
should the physical location of the registry imply
that the legislative body of that country can assert “special”
jurisdiction over the domain names in that database
even if registrars and registrants are distributed globally? It is also
unclear as to what is meant by “domain name authority” referenced
above and whether it is a specific reference to ICANN, a California-based
corporation.
The ITU currently plays a direct
role in two parts of the ICANN structure: the Governmental Advisory
Committee and the Protocol Supporting Organization. Also of direct
interest to ITU is the .int top level domain and further work on domain
name dispute resolution with regard to the Union’s names and acronyms.
These issues are discussed below.
It is unclear to the ITU
Secretariat as to the impetus for the establishment of the GAC in
ICANN’s bylaws. The US government’s view in the White Paper indicated
that: “the U.S. continues to believe…that neither national governments
acting as sovereigns nor intergovernmental organizations acting as
representatives of governments should participate in management of
Internet names and addresses”. It also specified, in its requirements
for the bylaws of the new corporation, that they should “restrict
official government representation on the Board of Directors without
precluding governments and intergovernmental organizations from
participating as Internet users or in a non-voting advisory capacity.”
Apart from specifically barring government policy makers from the BoD,
certain ambiguity still remains. For example, in the GAC, interventions
are clearly made in an official capacity on behalf of sovereigns.
There are a range of views on the
appropriate level of governmental involvement in management of Internet
names and addresses. Some administrations are clearly comfortable with the
“self-regulatory” approach embodied by ICANN and are willing to
provide a supportive secondary role to industry private-sector
self-regulation. Others believe that certain DNS issues (e.g., ccTLDs)
relate to national sovereignty, do not require involvement of ICANN, and
are subject only to domestic arrangements. Others appear to be somewhat
circumspect in entrusting ICANN with responsibilities they consider more
appropriately exercised through the more formal framework of multilateral
organizations (e.g., intellectual property issues – see Section
2.4
). Generally it can be said that there is increased
attention by governments in the management of Internet names and addresses
– particularly where there is an overlap with other public policy issues
(e.g., intellectual property, promotion of competition, consumer
protection, telecommunications regulation).
The ITU Secretariat has to date
participated in four GAC meetings, coinciding with ICANN meetings. The
agenda, minutes, Chair’s report, and Media Communiqué for all GAC
meetings are available on the GAC web site.[lxvi]
Currently 25-30 governments and
multilateral organizations, representing a large percentage of current
Internet users, actively participate in GAC meetings. There is some
concern over the lack of broader participation by governments, especially
developing countries.
The most significant work of the
GAC to date directly concerns ITU Member States. It is the preparation of
a documented entitled “Principles for the Delegation and Administration
of Country Code Top Level Domains” which has been communicated to the
ICANN BoD.[lxvii]
This document declares that the “ultimate public policy authority for
the administration of ccTLDs rests with governments and public
authorities”. It is intended by the GAC to guide the replacement of the
policies described in ICANN’s ICP-1: “Internet Domain Name System
Structure and Delegation”[lxviii]
based on a 1994 Internet standard, RFC 1591.[lxix]
In response to this and other
proposals, the ICANN BoD passed a resolution at their March 2000 Cairo
meeting on “ccTLD Administration and Delegation Policies” directing
that new “draft language for contracts, policy statements, and/or
communications” be prepared.[lxx]
It is not clear whether this represents an endorsement of the GAC document
by the ICANN BoD.
In general, ICANN’s BoD have
exhibited a certain reserve about the advice of the GAC. While no clear
differences of opinion have emerged, if they do, it may lead to a
re-evaluation of the GAC’s usefulness or advisory role. In this respect,
it is a unique experiment that intergovernmental-type policy formulation
(which GAC activities appear to resemble) requires further endorsement by
a private corporation’s BoD. Therefore, the exact significance of GAC
findings and advice, considering its advisory role in ICANN’s bylaws,[lxxi]
is somewhat ambiguous. Clearly there are differing views on this topic. As
one example, the European Commission has put forward the need for
“necessary governmental oversight of ICANN, that should be exercised on
a multilateral basis, in the first instance through the Governmental
Advisory Committee”.[lxxii]
In
July 1999, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between ICANN and
Internet-related standardization organizations to create ICANN’s
Protocol Supporting Organization.[lxxiii]
The signatories include the ITU, Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”),
World Wide Web Consortium (“W3C”) and European Telecommunication
Standards Institute (“ETSI”). ITU’s participation is coordinated by
the ITU‑T. One role of the PSO is to appoint 3 directors to
ICANN’s BoD.
In
general, technical coordination between standards organizations takes
place, as needed, on a bilateral basis. For example, in a related activity
in January 2000, ITU-T Study Group 2 hosted an “IP-Telecoms Interworking
Workshop” focusing on Numbering, Naming, Addressing and Routing (“NNAR”).
This workshop included the participation of IETF leadership and resulted
in an agreement on fourteen issues to be addressed either by the IETF, the
ITU, or jointly by the IETF-ITU. These issues and their disposition are
available on the ITU-T web site.[lxxiv]
Of notable interest are draft proposals that would provide mapping between
the Internet Domain Name System (“DNS”) and the ITU-T E.164 numbering
plan. This may imply that the ITU-T may need to play a coordination role
for DNS zones that parallel its current top-level E.164 management
responsibilities.[lxxv]
Following last year’s Council
endorsement of ITU management of the .int top level domain (originally
intended for intergovernmental organizations), there has been little
progress in discussions with ICANN and the US government (who have policy
authority over the Internet DNS root server[lxxvi]) in implementing this
decision. One barrier has been the existence of Internet infrastructure
related domain names under the .int top level domain which required
additional discussions with the Internet Architecture Board (“IAB”).
Following further discussions between the IAB and the US government, the
Secretariat’s understanding is that “.arpa” (an acronym for the US
“Advance Research Projects Agency”), a long existing but little-used
top level domain, is to be reserved for future Internet infrastructure
purposes (managed directly by ICANN). Therefore, there may be a migration
of certain Internet infrastructure related domain names under .int to .arpa.
Although the Secretariat’s understanding is that .int will be eventually
transferred to the ITU for management, there are no details from ICANN or
the US government on how or when this will occur.
As noted last year in Document
C99/51, the ITU has provided comments to WIPO pertaining to the protection
of the Union’s names and acronyms in all gTLDs. Specifically,
“recognition should be given to the protections afforded to the
identifiers of these organizations under Article 6ter of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property (1967) or the
corresponding provision of the TRIPS Agreement.”
[lxxvii]
The Union’s remarks were
reflected in a recommendation in the WIPO Final Report that said: “It is
recommended that ICANN initiate a process designed to address the problem
of the abusive registration of the names and acronyms of international
intergovernmental organizations…before the introduction of any new
gTLDs.”[lxxviii]
To date, ICANN has not taken any related action.
It is unclear in which forum
further work on the intersection of intellectual property and domain names
will take place. There is a possibility that, at the request of some
Member States, WIPO could undertake an additional study on domain name
dispute resolution issues (e.g., including the names and acronyms of
intergovernmental organizations, personal names, and geographical and
place names). However, it is not clear whether any findings or
recommendations would be submitted to WIPO Member States, to ICANN, or to
both.
In the year after Council 2000,
there are at least two major issues that make it uncertain whether ICANN
will be more successful than previous efforts in significantly evolving
the DNS. The first is the long-delayed question of how and when new top
level domains will be added — and who will have rights to control the
registry databases that keep track of new domain names underneath them.
The second is whether NSI[lxxix]
will divest control of its registry or registrar roles (or neither) within
the next year as discussed in Section
4.1
. The answers to these questions will have a major
impact on both the DNS and the future of ICANN.
********
[i]
http://www.itu.int/net/ip/res102.htm
[ii]
http://www.itu.int/itudoc/gs/council/c99/docs/docs1/051.html
[iii]
A term first defined by the Internet Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC) – see
http://www.iahc.org
[iv]
Based on the ISO 3166 Standard. See http://www.din.de/gremien/nas/nabd/iso3166ma/
and the extensive discussion of the relationship of ISO 3166 to
Internet top level domains at http://www.itu.int/itudoc/gs/council/c99/docs/docs1/othdoc/ip-net.html
[v]
http://www.networksolutions.com/legal/internic/cooperative-agreement/agreement.html
[vi]
http://www.netsol.com
[vii]
When NSI began domain name registrations in the spring of 1993,
approximately 400 domain names were being registered per month. By
comparison, in January 2000, NSI processed approximately 260,000
registrations in .com, .net, and .org. See http://www.nsol.com/news/2000/pr_20000427.html
[viii]
http://www.networksolutions.com/legal/internic/cooperative-agreement/amendment4.html.
Note that 30% of this money went into an “Infrastructure Fund”
which led to lawsuits about its “constitutionality”.
[ix]
http://www.networksolutions.com/legal/internic/cooperative-agreement/amendment9.html
[x]
http://www.nsol.com/news/2000/pr_20000427.html
[xii]
The closest parallel is probably freephone (e.g., 800) number
administration.
[xiv]
George Strawn, representative of the US National Science Foundation,
who was responsible for the Network Solutions cooperative agreement.
[xvi]
http://www.wipo.int
[xviii]
http://www.iahc.org/draft-iahc-recommend-00.html
[xix]
This was a radical concept in 1997 despite its feasibility having
already been proved at that time by Nominet, the .uk (Great Britain)
domain registry. It is also a model widely used for telephony number
portability services.
[xx]
http://www.gtld-mou.org/docs/dispute.html
[xxi]
http://www.gtld-mou.org
[xxii]
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm
[xxiii]
“As these functions are now performed in the United States, by U.S.
residents, and to ensure stability, the new corporation should be
headquartered in the United States, and incorporated in the U.S. as a
not-for-profit corporation.” See http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm
[xxv]
http://www.icann.org/general/abouticann.htm
[xxvi]
http://www.icann.org/announcements/icann-pr13oct98.htm
[xxvii]
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/press/icann102098.htm
[xxviii]
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann-memorandum.htm
[xxix]
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icannnewco.htm
[xxx]
The creation and opening of the SRS to new registrars was a result of
negotiations between NSI and the US government also resulted in a two
year extension of its “Cooperative Agreement” with the US
government until September 2000. See http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/docnsi100698.htm
[xxxi]
http://www.icann.org/general/icann-org-chart_frame.htm
[xxxii]
http://www.icann.org/at-large/at-large.htm
[xxxiii]
http://www.icann.org/support-orgs.htm
[xxxv]
http://www.icann.org/dnso/dnso.htm
[xxxvii]
http://www.icann.org/committees/
[xxxix]
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accreditation-overview.htm
[xl]
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html
[xli]
From the original April 29, 1997 version of the document at http://www.nsol.com/policy/internet.html
later replaced with a different version dated June 6, 1997.
[xlii]
http://www.icann.org/nsi/nsi-agreements.htm
[xliii]
http://www.icann.org/nsi/factsheet.htm
[xliv]
The US government must approve any transition of the registry business
to another entity.
[xlv]
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm
[xlvi]
http://ecommerce.wipo.int/domains/process/eng/processhome.html
[xlvii]
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm
[xlviii]
http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-list.htm
[xlix]
http://www.gtld-mou.org/docs/dispute.html
[l]
http://www.din.de/gremien/nas/nabd/iso3166ma/
[li]
http://www.icann.org/general/ps-report-22mar00.htm
[lii]
http://www.ispo.cec.be/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/DotEU/WorkDocEN.html
[liii]
http://www.ispo.cec.be/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/DotEU/responses.html
[liv]
http://www.ispo.cec.be/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/DotEU/Analysis_of_responses.html
[lv]
Although there have been past exceptions to deviation from the ISO
3166-1 standard. In the case of the United Kingdom, the associated
Internet top level domain is “.uk” instead of “.gb” (Great
Britain) due to historical reasons of Internet development in this
country. In addition, Internet top level domains based on codes for
Ascension Island (.ac), Guernsey (.gg), Isle of Man (.im), and Jersey
(.je) were allocated by IANA. These codes were in an “exceptionally
reserved” alpha-2 code set maintained by the ISO 3166 MA (like “EU”)
and are not part of the ISO 3166 Standard-1. “That policy proved
unsatisfactory and was quickly abandoned in favor of strict adherence
to the ISO 3166-1 list”. See http://www.icann.org/general/ps-report-22mar00.htm
[lvi]
http://www.dnso.org/dnso/notes/20000419.NCgtlds-statement.html
[lvii]
http://www.icann.org/dnso/gtld-topic-20apr00.htm
[lviii]
http://www.nsol.com/policy/gtldpaper20000419.html
[lix]
http://www.icann.org/yokohama/new-tld-topic.htm
[lx]
The US government must approve any transition of the registry business
to another entity.
[lxi]
http://www.icann.org/nsi/nsi-agreements.htm
[lxiii]
“The conferees direct the General Accounting Office to review the
relationship between the Department of Commerce and the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and to issue a
report no later than June, 2000. The conferees request that GAO
review: (1) the legal basis for the selection of U.S. representatives
to ICANN’s interim board and for the expenditure of funds by the
Department for the costs of U.S. representation and participation in
ICANN’s proceedings; (2) whether U.S. participation in ICANN
proceedings is consistent with U.S. law, including the Administrative
Procedures Act; (3) a legal analysis of the Department of Commerce’s
opinion that OMB Circular A 25 provides ICANN, as a “project
partner”‘ with the Department of Commerce, authority to impose
fees on Internet users for ICANN’s operating costs; and (4) whether
the Department has the legal authority to transfer control of the
authoritative root server to ICANN. In addition, the conferees seek
GAO’s evaluation and recommendations regarding placing
responsibility for U.S. participation in ICANN under the National
Institute of Standards and Technology rather than NTIA, and request
that GAO review the adequacy of security arrangements under existing
Departmental cooperative agreements.” See ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/cp106/hr398.txt
[lxiv]
This is dependent on the ratio of usage of ccTLDs versus gTLDs in a
country.
[lxv]
http://www.icann.org/nsi/factsheet.htm
[lxvi]
http://www.noie.gov.au/gac/
[lxviii]
http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-1.htm
[lxix]
http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1591.txt
[lxx]
http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-10mar00.htm
[lxxi]
http://www.icann.org/gac/gac.htm
[lxxii]
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the
Organisation and Management of the Internet, April 11, 2000. See
http://www.ispo.cec.be/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/Organisation/COM(2000)202.doc
[lxxiv]
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/ip-telecoms/attachments.htm
[lxxv]
http://search.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-vaudreuil-enum-e164dir-01.txt
[lxxvi]
http://www.icann.org/nsi/factsheet.htm
[lxxvii]
http://wipo2.wipo.int/dns_comments/rfc3/0163.html
[lxxviii]
http://ecommerce.wipo.int/domains/process/eng/processhome.html,
Sections 292-303.
[lxxix]
Purchased for US$ 21 billion in stock in March 2000 by Versign, Inc.
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