Coalition of
Service Industries
Statement
on the
World Trade Organization
Group on Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper
October 1997
INTRODUCTION
On February 15, 1997, a landmark Telecommunications Agreement was
reached by some 68
members of the World Trade Organization to liberalize basic
telecommunications services. As an
underpinning for economic development in virtually every industry
sector, this agreement in
telecommunications was both vital and precedent setting in two
aspects. First, it represents a
successful single-sectoral negotiation. All of the commitments
which were made benefited the
telecommunications sector. Second, the agreement contained
commitments to implement a set of
pro-competitive regulatory principles known as the
"Reference Paper." This inclusion of regulatory
principles in a trade agreement was a significant development.
The dependence of essentially every business activity on
telecommunications has focused the attention
of the world on the costs and methods of delivering this service
medium. The negotiations which were
concluded under the auspices of the World Trade Organization's
Group on Basic Telecommunications
(GBT) will have tremendous impact on the cost and delivery of
telecommunications services
worldwide.
The Reference Paper, many people believe, lies at the very heart
of the agreement. The regulatory
principles committed by the various governments outline not so
much what will be done, but rather
how it will be done. Being a trade agreement, however, the
principles are understandably high-level
and general. The purpose of this document and of the Coalition of
Service Industries is to provide our
interpretation of this extremely important document.
THE COALITION OF SERVICE INDUSTRIES
The Coalition of Service Industries (CSI) was established in 1982
to represent the interests of the
largest segment of the U.S. economy, the service sector. Since
its founding, CSI has directed its
efforts toward increasing public awareness of the major role
services play in our national economy,
and to shaping domestic and foreign policies that affect the
interests of that sector.
The broad range and diversity of the service economy is reflected
in the Coalition's membership which
includes major international companies from the banking,
insurance, telecommunications, computer
and information services, maritime transport, travel and tourism,
accountancy, transportation and
logistics, and diversified management services sectors. CSI's
member companies conduct business in
all fifty states and in over 150 countries. In addition, the
Coalition of Service Industries is active with
equivalent organizations in other countries.
The Telecommunications Services Working Group of CSI was formed
in July, 1996, specifically to
ensure that the business users' voice was heard in the
discussions leading to an agreement in the GBT.
As such, it represents the interests of service industry
corporations that use telecommunications
services to conduct their business, both in the United States and
around the world. Within the working
group there are companies that require access to basic
telecommunications services in order to serve
their customers, as well as companies that require advanced
telecommunications services to meet the
internal needs of their foreign subsidiaries. Following the
agreement, the group received a charter to
continue to advocate telecommunications and information
technology policies and positions globally
which were beneficial to the service industries.
BACKGROUND
During the course of the negotiations, CSI argued that, above
all, business users need, and are
committed to, the establishment of a completely open and
competitive international
telecommunications regime through the successful completion of
the GBT negotiations. Although
telecommunications has brought considerable benefits to
individuals, schools, and public
administrations, and the future promises to revolutionize those
uses even further, the infrastructure that
will drive the expansion will primarily be developed to fulfill
the needs of business users and will be
employed by them first. Businesses are moving aggressively into
new markets and need to be
supported by competitive telecommunications users services.
Specifically, business users need:
Effective International Telecommunications
To be competitive, business often works under tight deadlines to
respond to changing market
demands and priorities. If a market opportunity suddenly opens or
becomes more active in a particular
location or region, telecommunications can make it possible to
make the most of that opportunity.
Likewise, opening international telecommunications to marketplace
competition will result in increased
commercial trade. Changing conditions, new priorities, and
flexible business strategies all contribute to
the constant need to reconfigure and add telecommunications
capabilities.
Low-Cost Telecommunications
Telecommunications prices, as well as the underlying laws and
public policies regarding competition
and investment, then, have an enormous impact on the health of
any country's economy. All other
factors being equal, those countries that are better able to
provide competitively priced
telecommunications services will attract foreign investment.
Moreover, efficient telecommunications
infrastructures will make users more efficient and
internationally competitive.
Good Quality Telecommunications
Today's businesses are more self sufficient in the management of
their information systems than ever
before. The integration of technologies and services required to
support internal operations, product
and service delivery, and customer satisfaction has become the
responsibility of each business.
Unreliable telecommunications services have no part in the
business system. Those who provide
low-quality telecommunications services will be avoided by
business and eliminated as service
providers by the market. If that provider happens to be a
monopoly provider in some country, then
that entire country will be largely bypassed by business.
ROLE OF THE REFERENCE PAPER
The acceptance of the Reference Paper (in whole or in substantial
part) by 65 World Trade
Organization ("WTO") member countries has rightly been
recognized as one of the most significant
aspects of the landmark WTO agreement on February 15, 1997. Its
near-universal acceptance by the
WTO member countries making market access commitments in the
negotiations evidences the
widespread recognition among the participants that such
commitments have little value unless service
providers also obtain the ability to compete in other WTO member
countries on a full and fair basis,
which requires, among other things, access to the public
telecommunications transport networks of
incumbent suppliers under non-discriminatory terms and at
cost-oriented rates.
The definitions and principles in the regulatory framework for
basic telecommunications services set
forth in the Reference Paper also reflect a global consensus on
the key regulatory requirements to
ensure non-discriminatory market access, including competitive
safeguards, non-discriminatory
interconnection, competitively neutral universal service
obligations, independent regulators, and
non-discriminatory procedures for the allocation and use of
scarce resources. In a few countries, many
of these safeguards already exist by statute or by regulation.
Indeed, the requirements of the Reference
Paper are the direct product of the experience of those countries
that have already opened their
markets to competition.
The Reference Paper establishes definitions and principles for
these key requirements, but does not
always explain how they should be applied. The purpose of this
document is to provide additional
clarification from the perspective of business users in order to
assist their global application in a
consistent manner, and to help ensure that the non-discriminatory
market access that individual WTO
members have committed to provide is not undermined by
anticompetitive practices or by unequal
treatment. The paper provides a section-by-section explanation of
the Reference Paper, with each
section of the Reference Paper printed in bold italicized text.
The Coalition of Service Industries
believes that business users will derive substantial benefits
from an appropriate application of these
principles.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE REFERENCE PAPER
"Definitions
Users mean service consumers and service suppliers.
Essential facilities mean facilities of a public
telecommunications transport network or
service that
(a) are exclusively or predominately provided by a single or
limited number of suppliers; and
(b) cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted in
order to provide a service.
A major supplier is a supplier which has the ability to
materially affect the terms of
participation (having regard to price and supply) in the relevant
market for basic
telecommunications services as a result of:
(a) control over essential facilities; or
(b) use of its position in the market."
Essential Facilities: The public telecommunications transport
networks of incumbent suppliers are
examples of essential or "bottleneck" facilities that
no other supplier can feasibly duplicate in any
reasonable timeframe. While new entrants may construct portions
of transport networks, they will
seldom, if ever, have the economic resources necessary to
replicate the entire network of the
incumbent supplier to obtain the ubiquitous access to users that
is required to provide basic
telecommunications services. Consequently, suppliers and users
will not receive the benefits of the
WTO market access commitments in basic telecommunications unless
they also obtain timely access
to the networks of incumbent suppliers under non-discriminatory
terms and conditions and at
cost-oriented rates. However, to the extent that the duplication
of a public telecommunications
transport network does take place, then the incumbent's facility
is no longer an essential facility.
Major Suppliers: The Reference Paper defines major suppliers as
those suppliers that have "the
ability to materially affect the terms of participation (having
regard to price and supply) in the relevant
market for basic telecommunications services" as a result of
either their "control over essential
facilities" or their "position in the market."
Major suppliers must therefore be able to exercise market
power in the relevant market, either as a result of their control
of essential facilities, or as shown by
their ability to raise price and restrict output in the relevant
market.
Where a supplier does not control essential facilities, it cannot
be classified as a major supplier without
a competitive analysis to determine whether it can exert market
power in the relevant market. This
requires consideration of the supplier's market share in that
market, entry conditions, elasticities of
supply and demand, and other competitive conditions. Market
shares, by themselves, are not the sole
determining factor of whether a firm possesses market power.
"1. Competitive safeguards
1.1 Prevention of anti-competitive practices in
telecommunications
Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purpose of
preventing suppliers who,
alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or
continuing anti-competitive
practices.
1.2 Safeguards The anticompetitive practices referred to above
shall include in particular:
(a) engaging in anticompetitive cross-subsidization;"
Preventing Anticompetitive Cross-Subsidization: The
non-competitive activities of the major
supplier, such as its operation of essential facilities, should
be kept separated from the major supplier's
competitive operations, either structurally or through accounting
separations. Structural separation
through the creation of fully separated subsidiaries is the most
effective way to prevent anticompetitive
practices when a major supplier engages in both competitive and
non-competitive activities.
Separation may also be achieved through non-structural accounting
separations, provided that the
method of separation is open to public scrutiny and comment, and
that any methodological differences
or inconsistencies are resolved by an independent regulatory
authority.
The major supplier's competitive services should be required to
deal with its non-competitive services
on an "arm's-length" basis. Structural or accounting
separations will help ensure that the major supplier
does not obtain products and services from the non-competitive
arm of the major supplier under more
favorable terms and conditions than those available to
non-affiliated suppliers, or otherwise engage in
anticompetitive cross-subsidization by shifting competitive costs
to its non-competitive services.
Structurally separated subsidiaries should operate independently
from the major supplier in the
provision of competitive services, maintain its own books of
account, have separate officers, directors,
and employees who may not also serve as officers, directors or
employees of the major supplier,
secure its financing in a manner that will not permit creditors
recourse to the assets of the major
supplier, and not jointly own or share the use of any property
with the major supplier. Accounting
separations should use a predetermined system of accounts,
clearly identify pre-separated revenues,
investments and expenses, and employ cost allocation procedures
developed by the regulatory body
in consultation with national accounting standard-setting bodies.
Reporting requirements may include
balance sheets, income statements, joint cost reports, detailed
revenue, investment and expense
reports by entity, tax reports by entity, network usage reports
by entity, and the studies conducted to
develop cost allocators. All such information should be made
publicly available, with competitively
sensitive data protected via non-disclosure agreements.
Separate commercial activities should also be required. The major
supplier should not be allowed to
market its competitive and non-competitive services jointly
through either shared advertising,
telemarketing and sales support, or the packaging of competitive
and non-competitive services into
combined offerings. The sharing of marketing and sales resources
also allows the major supplier to
assign competitive marketing or sales costs to its
non-competitive operations. Such misallocations
artificially lower the cost of competitive services while
inflating the cost of non-competitive services.
"b) using information obtained from competitors with
anti-competitive results;"
Protecting Proprietary Information: A major supplier should be
required to protect all information
obtained through its operation of non-competitive services
against unauthorized disclosure. Protection
should be afforded to all information, such as competitors'
business and marketing plans, trunking
configurations, peak usage, network architecture, and equipment
types, obtained through the provision
of facilities to unaffiliated suppliers. Statutory or regulatory
measures supported by adequate penalties
should prohibit any unauthorized release to the major supplier's
own competitive arm or to any third
party, and major suppliers should be required to take affirmative
steps to protect against such
disclosure.
In addition, a major supplier should also be prohibited from
utilizing its unique access to customer
information acquired through the provision of non-competitive
services in targeting specific users for its
competitive service offerings. Nor should the non-competitive arm
of the major supplier be permitted
to influence a user's decision to select its competitive sector
supplier.
Protecting Information Service Provider Information: When a major
supplier with market power
has its own affiliated provider of information services, an
appropriate separation between the two
entities is important. Network requirements often reveal
potential customers and characteristics of the
proposed solution. Thus, the major supplier may potentially
convey sensitive business information to its
affiliate or provide its affiliate more favorable terms, prices,
and connections.
In this case structural separation is required. The affiliate
should be required to operate independently
from the major supplier in the provision of competitive services,
maintain its own books of account,
have separate officers, directors, and employees who may not also
serve as officers, directors or
employees of the major supplier, secure its financing in a manner
that will not permit creditors recourse
to the assets of the major supplier, and not jointly own or share
the use of any property with the major
supplier.
Additionally, all transactions between the major supplier and any
such separate affiliate should be
required to be reduced to writing and available for public
inspection, and conducted on an
arm's-length basis in the same manner as the major supplier
conducts business with unaffiliated
persons. A major supplier should not be permitted to discriminate
between its separate affiliate and
any other person in the provision or procurement of goods,
services, facilities and information or in the
establishment of standards.
"c) not making available to other services suppliers on a
timely basis technical information
about essential facilities and commercially relevant information
which are necessary for
them to provide service."
The Timely Disclosure of Technical and Commercial Information:
Major suppliers are required
to make timely disclosure of the technical and other relevant
commercial information that other service
suppliers or users need to provide services. Thus, all
information regarding the provisioning of
interconnection, such as standards, forthcoming changes,
additions, or deletions to interconnection
standards, processing requests, timing changes and billing
arrangements, should be made available to
all suppliers.
This information should be made available in a medium commonly
available to the telecommunications
industry. Publication should be in a timely manner, in order to
ensure that other service suppliers and
users are not disadvantaged and have adequate time to respond to
complete any modifications
required.
"2. Interconnection
2.1 This section applies to linking with suppliers providing
public telecommunication
transport networks or services in order to allow the users of one
supplier to communicate
with users of another supplier and to access services provided by
another supplier, where
specific commitments are undertaken.
2.2 Interconnection to be ensured
Interconnection with a major supplier will be ensured at any
technically feasible point in the
network. Such interconnection is provided:
i. under non-discriminatory terms, conditions (including
technical standards and
specifications) and rates and of a quality no less favourable
than that provided for [the major
supplier's] own like services or for like services of
non-affiliated service suppliers or for its
subsidiaries or other affiliates;"
Non-Discriminatory Terms and Conditions for Interconnection at
Any Technically Feasible
Point in the Network: In order for new market entrants to provide
service, they must be able to
interconnect with the networks of major suppliers. In most
countries, the major supplier controls
ubiquitous network infrastructure and is the only economically
feasible and timely means by which
other service suppliers may obtain access to end users. To be
able to compete effectively, a new
entrant must be assured of interconnection equal in all respects
to that which major suppliers provide
to themselves and to other service suppliers.
The obligation of major suppliers to allow other service
suppliers to interconnect "at any technically
feasible point in the network" applies to their entire
networks. Major suppliers should therefore
provide interconnection under non-discriminatory, cost-oriented
terms and conditions for all types of
services and suppliers at all technically feasible points from
international cables and satellite earth
stations through to local cellular and wireline switches. This
enables other service suppliers to avoid
unnecessary costs by interconnecting with the major supplier in
accordance with their own capabilities
to provide switching and transport.
Non-Discriminatory Technical Standards and Specifications: The
technical ability to
interconnect under non-discriminatory terms and conditions
requires interoperability among networks
implemented through standardized, open interfaces. Such
interoperability allows a new entrant to build
only as much infrastructure as it requires at any particular
stage of growth and to utilize major
suppliers' networks to fill in any missing pieces. With open
interfaces, all specifications are readily
available on a non-discriminatory basis to all suppliers and
users.
Non-Discriminatory Rates: Interconnection should be made
available at the same rates to all
interconnecting service suppliers, including the major supplier's
affiliates and subsidiaries. Similarly, the
principle of non-discrimination requires that the same rates
apply to all equivalent interconnection
arrangements irrespective of the type of service that is offered
or the nature of the interconnecting
service supplier.
Non-Discriminatory Quality: The quality of interconnection should
be equivalent for each
interconnecting service supplier and equal to that which the
major supplier makes available to itself. It
should conform with all the conditions of technical/operational
quality and reliability established by
relevant standards bodies, including, for example, signal clarity
and strength, restoration intervals, and
signaling functions.
Non-Discriminatory End-User Access: Non-discriminatory
interconnection that "allow[s] the users
of one supplier to communicate with users of another
supplier" also requires that dialing procedures be
exactly the same for all suppliers so that the new entrant's
users can communicate on the same terms
as the major supplier's users. If interconnection arrangements
result in existing or potential users being
unable to reach the interconnecting service supplier as easily as
they can reach the major supplier, the
major supplier will have an unfair competitive advantage.
Dialing parity for all suppliers requires either the selection of
a supplier on a call-by-call basis or
supplier pre-selection with optional dial-around capabilities.
Supplier pre-selection with optional
dial-around, the better alternative, provides that users choose
in advance the primary supplier they
wish to use. However, users may wish to use a different supplier
for some calls to test a competitive
alternative, or to take advantage of another supplier's special
offer. They should therefore be able to
"dial around" their pre-selected primary supplier on a
call-by-call basis by entering a supplier code
before dialing the phone number.
The pre-selection process asks users to choose the supplier they
wish to use. Call-by-call supplier
selection, in which users choose the supplier they wish to use
every time they make a call by dialing the
chosen supplier's code and then the number they wish to reach is
less preferable than supplier
pre-selection. Call-by-call supplier selection requires all users
to learn a new dialing procedure,
whether they prefer to use the major supplier or a new entrant,
and to dial more digits than they
currently do.
If call-by-call selection is used, an affirmative choice must be
required, even to access the incumbent's
network. In the rare case where dialing parity is not yet
technically feasible, interconnection rates
should be adjusted to compensate for this disadvantage.
The terms, conditions, and service areas provided by a major
supplier to itself and to other service
suppliers should be equivalent in all respects including, but not
limited to, the following areas: location,
information, ordering procedures, ordering intervals,
provisioning intervals, billing arrangements,
maintenance and testing, physical characteristics of
interconnection, protocol characteristics of
interconnection, credit terms, and warranties or guarantees.
"(b) Provided in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions
(including technical standards and
specifications) and cost-oriented rates that are transparent,
reasonable (having regard to
economic feasibility), and sufficiently unbundled so that the
supplier need not pay for
network components or facilities that it does not require for
service to be provided."
The Timely Provision of Interconnection: Major suppliers have
many opportunities and strong
incentives to delay the provision of interconnection to other
service suppliers, and delays can
significantly inhibit the development of competition. To avoid
these results, a strict timetable should be
established for the provision of interconnection, including the
conduct of negotiations and the
implementation of interconnection arrangements. A maximum of six
to eight months would appear to
be reasonable for the entire process.
Cost-Oriented Rates: Interconnection rates set at above-cost
levels provide major suppliers with an
unwarranted strategic advantage in markets where other service
suppliers must rely on them for the
provision of interconnection services. For example, in providing
domestic long distance or international
service, a major supplier could price its retail competitive
offerings at below-cost rates,
cross-subsidizing them through higher interconnection charges.
Under these circumstances, the major
supplier could eventually drive other service suppliers from the
market. Interconnection rates should
therefore be set at cost-oriented levels.
Cost oriented rates should not include historic costs associated
with establishing the major supplier's
existing network. Rates charged to interconnecting service
providers should reflect forward looking
economic cost. Detailed transparent standards should be adopted
by regulatory authorities to be used
in determining cost attributable to specific features and
functions as well as common costs. Cost
oriented rates encourage the efficient use of, and investment in,
network infrastructure and best
promote the interests of users while providing major suppliers
the opportunities that would exist in a
competitive market to recover the costs of providing
interconnection.
Unbundling: Unbundling is the identification and disaggregation
of physical components of the
network into a set of "piece parts" that can be
individually provided, costed, priced, and utilized to
provide any service offering, including those offered by the
major supplier. This requires that other
service suppliers be able to access selectively only those
components of the major supplier's network
actually needed and to be charged only those components'
cost-oriented rates. Unbundling removes
the burden of purchasing unneeded or redundant feature
functionality.
Uniform, consistent unbundling requires the development of
criteria for the identification of network
disaggregation points. Unbundled network elements should allow
for uniformity across networks; be
consistent with existing network architectures; allow for the
identification of stand-alone, modular
components; utilize interfaces between components that exist and
are specified for vendor use; and be
easily supplemented as new architectures are deployed. Each
should have a clearly identified and
standard interface for access or egress with a voice, data,
video, or other information path, be
measurable and billable, and utilize transmission protocol and
physical interconnection standards,
either existing or under development, that are recommended by an
acknowledged industry body.
"(c) Upon request, provided at points in addition to the
network termination points offered
to the majority of interconnecting service suppliers, subject to
charges that reflect the cost of
construction of necessary additional facilities."
Additional Network Points: Any identified set of unbundled
network components should not be
viewed as static. Further unbundling requirements will emerge in
response to supplier needs, future
market developments and technological change. To ensure
uniformity and consistency, the
identification of future disaggregation points should be based on
the same criteria as currently identified
points: each should have a clearly identified and standard
interface for access or egress with a voice,
data, video, or other information path, be measurable and
billable, and utilize transmission protocol
and physical interconnection standards, either existing or under
development, that are recommended
by an acknowledged industry body.
The major supplier should be compensated by the requesting
supplier for the additional expenses
entailed in additional unbundling, such as infrastructure
expansions, software modifications, ordering,
billing, and maintenance systems development, as identified
through the use of cost-oriented rates.
Detailed procedures should also be established for the processing
of requests for additional
unbundling. These procedures should specify request formats,
establish time frames for review,
response and implementation, and provide for regulatory recourse
if the request is not dealt with in a
fair and timely manner.
"2.3 Public availability of the procedures for
interconnection negotiations
The procedures applicable for interconnection to a major supplier
will be made publicly
available."
The Public Availability of Interconnection Procedures: Clearly
defined procedures set forth by
the responsible regulatory authority are essential for
non-discriminatory interconnection. Such
procedures should, at a minimum, establish the following: how a
supplier seeking interconnection is to
initiate negotiation; any specific information required to
request and conduct negotiations; when the
major supplier should respond to the request for interconnection;
whether the major supplier can
require additional information and any requirements concerning
the interconnecting service supplier's
response; how long parties should continue to negotiate if they
are unable to agree; the recourse to
regulatory authorities available in such circumstances; how the
interconnecting service supplier should
seek such recourse; when the regulator should respond; the period
in which the regulator should
prescribe the terms and conditions of interconnection in cases of
continued disagreement between the
parties; when the major supplier should complete interconnection;
the binding or non-binding nature of
arbitration of the regulator; and whether suppliers seeking
interconnection have additional recourse
through the judicial process.
Such procedures will be successfully utilized only if all
interested parties have the opportunity to avail
themselves of their rights and opportunities. The information
described above should therefore be
published in media readily accessible to other service suppliers.
"2.4 Transparency of interconnection arrangements
It is ensured that a major supplier will make publicly available
either its interconnection
agreements or a reference interconnection offer."
Publicly Availability of Interconnection Agreements or Reference
Interconnection Offer: The
public availability of all prices, terms and conditions for
interconnection to the networks and services
of the major supplier promotes non-discriminatory treatment by
ensuring that all suppliers have access
to the information they require to design services and to plan
market entry and expansion strategies.
Whether this information is made publicly available in the form
of copies of all existing agreements or
as a reference offer, public disclosure of the arrangements
should include, at a minimum, the following
matters: pricing schedules; ordering and provisioning processes;
unbundled network elements; support
functions, such as routing to directory assistance, operator and
repair services and access to line
information data bases; service functions, such as work order
processes, service ordering and
provisioning, maintenance, provision of user usage data,
service/operation readiness testing, and billing
for service; arrangements for prior notification of changes in
services provided, such as the
introduction of new services, features, or functions; and
requirements for specific services and custom
features.
Where this information is provided in the form of copies of
interconnection agreements, these should
be made publicly available as soon as they are finalized. Where a
reference interconnection offer is
used to provide this information, it should be sufficiently
comprehensive to include all material terms
and conditions from the interconnection arrangements entered into
by the major supplier and should be
updated on a regular basis to include any different features from
new interconnection arrangements.
"2.5 Interconnection: Dispute Settlement
A service supplier requesting interconnection with a major
supplier will have recourse,
either:
a) at any time; or
b) after a reasonable time period which has been made publicly
known,
before an independent domestic body, which may be a regulatory
body as referred to in
paragraph 5 below, to resolve disputes regarding appropriate
terms, conditions, and rates for
interconnection within a reasonable period of time, to the extent
that these have not been
established previously."
Recourse to Dispute Settlement: Procedures for the swift
resolution of disputes by an independent
arbiter are also essential to ensure non-discriminatory
interconnection with the networks of major
suppliers. Other service suppliers should have such recourse at a
specific point after the beginning of
negotiations with the major supplier. The arbiter should be
required to prescribe the disputed terms,
conditions or rates normally within a specific time period in a
public, written decision setting forth, in
detail, the reasons for the prescription.
The Need for an Independent Regulator: The most effective
independent domestic body to
resolve such disputes is an independent regulator. In addition to
providing timely and efficient dispute
resolution, the regulator should be authorized to prescribe
remedies for anti-competitive conduct and
to establish and enforce other regulatory requirements, such as
licensing procedures. It should also be
empowered to impose sanctions such as license revocations or
fines (subject to legal recourse).
"3. Universal Service
Any Member has the right to define the kind of universal service
obligation it wishes to
maintain. Such obligations will not be regarded as
anti-competitive per se, provided they are
administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and
competitively neutral manner and
are not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of universal
service defined by the
Member."
Transparent, Non-Discriminatory, Competitively Neutral Universal
Service Obligations
That Are Not More Burdensome Than Necessary: The social objective
of universal service has
traditionally meant making basic voice service affordable to all
consumers. While this has traditionally
been accomplished through cross-subsidies, such subsidies are
difficult to administer in competitive
markets without distorting competition. The Reference Paper
requires these social objectives to be
achieved in a competitively neutral, non-discriminatory manner
that is not more burdensome than
necessary.
The threshold consideration is to define what is included in
"universal" service. Only essential features,
such as basic voice service with tone signaling, should be part
of the social objective. While what is
deemed essential may well change and expand over time, the scope
of universal service should not be
expanded based only upon predictions that certain services will
become essential. Adding additional
features increases the costs of making them available as well as
the chance of prematurely mandating
services or features that are ultimately shown to be commercially
undesirable. Once this threshold
consideration is resolved, the achievement of that basic level of
service universally concerns two
separate issues: the obligation to build facilities; and the
mechanism for ensuring affordability.
The obligation to build facilities for the provision of universal
service should apply only to the major
supplier providing local service, where there is a major
supplier, as only the network of that supplier
will be sufficiently ubiquitous that mandatory expansion to a new
user would be not be overly
burdensome. However, if a competitive provider has already
undertaken to provide those facilities,
such as by wiring a new housing development, then the major
supplier should have no universal service
obligation with regard to these already-served users. Over time,
as new suppliers build up a larger
presence within a particular geographic area, competition for
users will obviate the need for the
government or regulator to compel a supplier to construct
facilities to serve a particular user. Instead,
the suppliers will vie with each other for the user's business.
Coverage requirements for the provision
of mobile services should be based upon the location of customers
to be served and not upon the
scope of the geographic area.
To ensure that the cost of universal service is not more
burdensome than necessary, any universal
service subsidy should cover only the shortfall between what the
user can afford to pay and the cost to
provide the basic level of service. Universal service should not
mean universal subsidy. Broad
subsidies introduce economic inefficiency into the system because
most users willing and able to pay
the full cost are also subsidized. Only users who cannot afford
the basic level of voice telephone
service should receive subsidies. These narrowly-targeted
subsidies for low-income users should be:
(1) based on clearly defined individual economic means tests; (2)
given to the individual user's supplier
of choice as competitive service options develop; and (3)
provided, if at all possible, through
mechanisms already established by the government for the
distribution of other similar funds in order to
minimize administration costs.
Subsidies for all users may be appropriate in remote, high-cost
areas where few users, regardless of
income level, could afford to pay the full cost of basic service.
Any supplier serving a user in such an
area should be eligible to receive the subsidy monies allocated
for that user. This provides the incentive
for competition to enter high-cost as well as low-cost areas.
The cost of universal service should be cost-based and allow for
a reasonable return on investment.
The regulator should stipulate the accounting and costing
methodology to be used in identifying these
costs. The regulator should then require the major supplier to
place its cost and allocation data on the
public record and allow for public comment, thus assuring the
regulator the benefit of additional
analysis and receipt of sufficient information needed to
establish accurate funding requirements.
The collection and distribution of the subsidy fund should be
performed in a competitively neutral
manner. In many cases, universal service obligations have been
paid for either through the inclusion of
subsidies in interconnection charges (where competition exists),
or through direct cross-subsidies from
one service to another. These methods, however effective in the
generation of funds, have detrimental
effects on the growth of telecommunications competition and
efficient network design and
implementation. Such blanket subsidies hinder rate rebalancing to
bring usage rates toward the costs
of providing service, create incentives to bypass the public
switched network and undermine the true
objective, which is the provision of affordable basic service.
Competitive neutrality also requires the funding of universal
service obligations, if not provided under
government social programs, to be borne by all service suppliers.
This can be achieved through a
percentage surcharge on the retail services of all suppliers
reflected as a separate line on the retail
user's bill. Such an approach guarantees that all subscribers
make a fair and equitable contribution.
Subsidy funds should be managed at the national level by a
neutral third party. This party would
determine which users should benefit from the subsidy, administer
the subsidy fund to ensure sufficient
monies are collected (including resetting the value of the
surcharge each year), and direct payments
from the pool to the user's supplier of choice. Alternatively, in
some instances, vouchers could be
provided to eligible users for their own use in the purchase of
services.
"4. Public availability of licensing criteria
Where a license is required, the following will be made publicly
available:
(a) all the licensing criteria and the period of time normally
required to reach a decision
concerning an application for a license and
(b) the terms and conditions of individual licenses.
The reasons for the denial of a license will be made known to the
applicant upon request."
Publicly Available Licensing Criteria: A transparent licensing
process requires the publication of
details of the characteristics of the license to be issued, the
information required from applicants, all
criteria to be considered in the licensing decision, and the
evaluation process itself, and the period of
time required to reach a decision. Disclosure of all such
information will put all applicants on an even
footing and allow them to submit their applications with full
knowledge of the terms on which their
applications are to be reviewed.
Approval of the licensees by the regulator should be accompanied
by a written, public decision
together with a statement of the reasons for the choice of the
successful applicants. An applicant
denied a license should, upon request, receive a written
statement from the regulator detailing the
reasons for the denial.
"5. Independent regulators
The regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, any
supplier of basic
telecommunications services. The decisions and the procedures
used by regulators shall be
impartial with respect to all market participants."
An Independent Regulator: The establishment of an empowered,
independent regulator is
necessary to develop, implement and enforce licensing procedures,
interconnection arrangements, and
competitive safeguards. In order to ensure the impartiality in
its decisions and procedures that is
required by the Reference Paper, the regulator should have
sufficient authority and resources to act on
a fully independent basis.
Separation between the regulator and all suppliers is necessary
to ensure that no unfair advantage is
bestowed on any supplier through regulatory actions. Without
sufficient separation, there is the
potential for regulatory actions to be taken that favor
particular suppliers, or that give the appearance
of such favored treatment. This is especially so where any
supplier is owned, entirely or in part, by the
government. In such circumstances, the required impartiality
cannot be achieved unless the regulatory
body is separate not only from all suppliers but also from the
ministry responsible for the management
of those suppliers.
"6. Allocation and use of scarce resources
Any procedures for the allocation and use of scarce resources,
including frequencies,
numbers and rights of way, will be carried out in an objective,
timely, transparent and
non-discriminatory manner. The current state of allocated
frequency bands will be made
publicly available, but detailed identification of frequencies
allocated for specific
government uses is not required."
Frequency allocation: Radioelectric spectrum is a highly
valuable, but limited, public resource with
unique characteristics and an ever-increasing array of possible
uses. Careful public planning and
management, including effective international coordination, are
therefore required to assure efficient
utilization of the resource and to limit interference and
interception.
The right to use spectrum for public or private services should
be granted pursuant to a fair and
transparent licensing process, in which opportunity should be
afforded to all qualified suppliers to
obtain and exploit licenses on reasonable terms and conditions.
Conflicting applications for the same
spectrum within the same geographic areas should be resolved by a
competitive process, in which the
criteria for award are publicly-announced and transparent and the
decision among multiple applicants
is reasonable and non-discriminatory.
License terms should be for extended periods in order to
encourage investment in facilities or other
assets, and there should be a reasonable expectation that
licenses will be renewed for comparable
periods, so long as all reasonable conditions of the original
license are met. License holders of
allocated spectrum should be accorded reasonable flexibility
within the terms of their original license to
utilize technologies and provide services as the demands of users
may justify. Spectrum channelization
should be flexible enough to accommodate a variety of
technologies.
In those cases where substantial fees are charged for the receipt
of a license to provide particular
services or subject to other specific conditions, regulators
should take care not to permit other
spectrum licenses to be used to provide those or similar services
without comparable charges being
levied. Likewise, new entrants into a given market should not be
accorded other license terms and
conditions, or provided with substantially greater allocations of
spectrum frequencies, such that existing
suppliers would be unfairly disadvantaged.
Within the geographical limits of their licenses, licensees
should normally be free to disaggregate their
allocated spectrum and to partition their service areas to
facilitate maximum efficiency in the use of
spectrum. The resale of services using allocated spectrum should
also be permitted.
To the extent feasible, and consistent with the coordination
processes of international organizations,
similar frequencies should be allocated for the provision of
similar services in each national jurisdiction.
Regulators should also take such other reasonable steps as may
encourage "roaming", which is the
handing-off of calls from one network to another in different
geographic locations.
Numbering Procedures: Numbers are the means by which
usersbusinesses gain access to the public
switched network. The importance of numbering resources will
become even greater as additional
telephone numbers are required to accommodate increasing demand
for existing services, as well as
the expected demand for new services. Numbering resources should
be administered in a fair and
non-discriminatory manner with numbering policies developed by a
neutral body whose composition
includes representatives from all segments of the
telecommunications industry. Administration of the
numbering plan in conformance with the approved numberingand
related policies should be by a
neutral, non-government third party. A mechanism for dispute
resolution for controversies not resolved
by the Number Administrator, should be established and
administered by the independent regulator.
The non-discriminatory use of existing numbering resources also
requires number portability. Users are
frequently reluctant to change suppliers where this requires a
change in telephone number. For users, a
change of number brings inconvenience and expense. For many
businesses, which may have significant
investments in advertising, stationery, and brand-awareness
related to their telephone number, the
expense is much greater. Ensuring that existing numbers do not
impede market entry by new suppliers
requires that users be able to maintain their local telephone and
free-phone numbers when they change
to a different supplier.
Rights of Way: A significant potential barrier to new
infrastructure suppliers seeking to construct their
own facilities is the inability to access the rights of way
required to place their facilities in conduits,
poles, and transmission towers on public or private lands.
Non-discrimination in the provision of rights
of way requires that market entrants be afforded the same rights,
accesses, privileges, and economic
incentives that were provided to the major infrastructure
supplier during the acquisition and
development of its rights of way.
New infrastructure suppliers should be granted maximum
flexibility in obtaining rights of way. They
should be allowed to enter into any commercially feasible
arrangement for the delivery of their
services, whether developing new rights of way, using existing
ones, or if practical, cooperating with
other providers for the joint installation and maintenance of
rights of way.
Even when it is technically and economically feasible for new
infrastructure suppliers to develop their
own rights of way, they may still be hampered by limited capacity
for underground conduits and
above-ground pole lines. Thus, to obtain non-discriminatory
market access, new infrastructure
suppliers should be assured fair access to rights of way
controlled by major suppliers at reasonable
terms and conditions.
Access to existing rights of way, whether public or private,
should be made available to all
infrastructure suppliers on a first-come, first-served basis, on
a space-available allocation, and in
accordance with all previously negotiated terms and conditions as
well as the environmental,
ecological, and public-safety regulations applicable to the major
supplier. Charges for existing rights of
way should consist of any relevant application, processing, or
registration fees, as well as reasonable
compensation for access to, and use and enhancement of, the
infrastructure. The price for using the
right of way should be made publicly available, be cost-based and
should not exceed the cost the
major supplier imputes to its own services.
Any cost for access and use of new public rights of way
controlled by a government body should be
covered by license or franchise fees assessed equitably among all
infrastructure suppliers using the
right of way. The exception would be for development costs, such
as surveys, environmental studies,
road repairs, and temporary traffic rerouting. Access to private
property for the development of new
rights of way should be obtained through private negotiation.
CONCLUSION
The introduction of competition into the telecommunications
sector is a complex process which
requires close and constant attention by an independent and
knowledgeable overseer. However, the
potential benefits are too great not to expend the necessary time
and resources required.
The Coalition of Service Industries hopes that this view provides
a useful framework for further
discussion of the implications of implementing the WTO agreement.
We look forward to participating
and sharing our views further in these discussions.
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