The pricing of radio spectrum: using incentives mechanisms to achieve efficiency

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
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Overview

- Spectrum pricing
- E Policy background in the UK
- **Administered Incentive Prices (AIP): Theory**
- III AIP: In practice
- Smith-NERA method
- III AIP revenues in the UK
- E Concluding remarks





Pricing spectrum

Traditionally spectrum has been:

- E Assigned free on a first come first served basis, or
- Second Assigned at a charge to recover administrative costs, or
- E Assigned at an arbitrary price intended to raise revenue
- In the UK pricing incentives introduced since 1998 Pricing of spectrum raises around £160m per year





Policy background in the UK

Independent Review of Radio Spectrum Management or 'Cave Review', March 2002:

Recommendation 7.9 of the review:

"Spectrum pricing should be applied at more realistic levels and more comprehensively across spectrum uses. Where spectrum pricing has already been implemented, and where there is evidence of continuing shortage of spectrum, then incentive prices should be set at the full opportunity cost level, rather than at the current 50 per cent of the levels derived from pricing models."





AIP: Theory

- III AIP are targeted at <u>economic</u> efficiency
- Economic efficiency has three dimensions:
 - Allocative efficiency (spectrum is allocated to uses and assigned to users in a way that best meets consumer interests)
 - Productive efficiency (spectrum is held by producers who are able to supply services at the lowest cost)
 - Dynamic efficiency (the holders of spectrum face the right incentives to innovate)
- In the absence of market determined prices for spectrum, AIP are a surrogate for missing markets
- **AIP** strictly aim at productive efficiency





AIP: In practice

- Smith-NERA (1996) proposed a method (call it the 'Smith-NERA Method') for calculating opportunity costs making use of 'the leastcost alternative' – emphasising the opportunity cost of assigning more/less spectrum to a user
- E Method calculates willingness to pay for a marginal unit of spectrum
 - For example, the marginal unit of spectrum for a cellular operator may be 2 x 2.4MHz (= 1 RF channel per sector in a 4 x 3 cluster)
 - The least cost-alternative for a cellular operator is the lowest cost way to meet current demand at the current quality level by adding/subtracting a marginal unit of spectrum to/from the operator's existing spectrum holding
 - This cost provides a figure for the marginal value of spectrum to the cellular operator
- AIP do not apply where spectrum rights have been assigned by auction – though post-auction assignments may be inefficient





Smith-NERA Method: example

Suppose:

- 3 uses for spectrum: I, II and III
- 3 different frequency bands: a, b and c
- Administrative management has resulted in band *a* being allocated to use I, band *b* to use II and band *c* to use III





Smith-NERA Method

	Frequency bands			Alternative non-spectrum input
Uses	а	b	С	
Ι	100	75	0	0
II	35	60	30	0
III	10	10	15	5

Table 1

	Frequency bands			Alternative non-spectrum input
Uses	A	b	С	
Ι	90	70	0	0
II	38	70	32	0
III	10	10	15	5

Table 2





Smith-NERA method


	Frequency bands			Alternative non-spectrum input
Uses	а	b	С	
Ι	87	68	0	0
II	36	68	25	0
III	12	12	25	4

Table 3





Efficient allocation of frequency band b







AIP revenues in the UK

AIP revenue raised by sector in the UK £000

Sector		2004/2005	2005/2006
1 Aeronautical		818	931
2 Amateur and Citizen's ba	nd	1,030	883
3 Broadcasting		2,454	4,001
4 Business Radio		15,187	11,838
5 Fixed Links		18,203	20,895
6 Maritime		1,723	2,031
7 Programme Making and S	Special Events	1,145	1,412
8 Public Wireless Networks	8	63,868	63,011
9 Science and technology		112	745
10 Satellite		928	974
11 Ministry of Defence		24,314	55,398
Total		132,168	<u> 164,094</u>





Concluding remarks

Suitability for AIP depends on:

Excess demand (existing and alternative uses)

Example: Can spectrum be used for something else?

EXAMPLE Are there policy or practical impediments?

- Example Apply to specific frequency bands and geographic areas as appropriate
- When AIP not appropriate, charges should be set to recover management costs
- III AIP is a good method of introducing incentive based mechanisms for managing radio spectrum



