Page 76 - FIGI: Security Aspects of Distributed Ledger Technologies
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300   Karame, G & Androulaki, E (2012) Two Bitcoins at the Price of One? Double-Spending Attacks on Fast Payments in
                Bitcoin, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2xWalEI; See also Podolanko, J & Ming, J et al. (2017) Countering Double-Spend
                Attacks on Bitcoin Fast-Pay Transactions, available at http:// bit .ly/ 32wX0AR
            301   Karame, G & Androulki, E, et al. (2015) Forwarding Double-Spending Attempts in the Network, available at https:// bit .ly/
                2FhKiMI
            302   Estimated to be as low as USD275,000 per hour against Bitcoin Core and USD75,000 against Ethereum as of December
                2018. Fadilpasic, S (2018) 51% Attacks on Crypto-currencies Are Getting Cheaper, available at https:// bit .ly/ 2KY8WTy
            303   At present, Crypto1 estimates a 51% attack on Bitcoin Core for one hour would cost USD315,000 and USD81,000 on
                Ethereum. See Crypto51 (2019) POW 51% Attack Cost, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2JDWR71; Bharel, D (2018) How Proof of
                Stake Renders a 51% Attack Unlikely and Unappealing, available at https:// bit .ly/ 2HeKVZw
            304   One view is that the best defense for smaller crypto projects wanting to protect themselves against a 51 percent attack
                is to use encryption algorithms not typically adopted by large virtual currencies. See Godshall, J (2018) Five Successful
                51 Percent Attacks Have Earned Cryptocurrency Hackers $20 Million in 2018, available at https:// bit .ly/ 2XNUjIz
            305   Craig, I  & Clarke, S, et al. (2018) The Hive: Agent-Based Mining in Litecoin Cash, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2JOwbPT
            306   Ehrsam, F (2017) Blockchain Governance: Programming Our Future, available at http:// bit .ly/ 30yHEdc
            307    Ehrsam, F (2017) Funding the Evolution of Blockchains, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2Y8PpJf
            308   Typosquatters and domain squatters have boasted using trade names of crypto-currencies to commit substantial
                fraud. https:// thenextweb .com/ hardfork/ 2019/ 03/ 21/ bitcoin -scammer -boasts -760000 -payday -through -dark -web
                -domain -squatting/
            309   With 8 Block Producers (BPs) of EOS of the top 21 being based in China, this has raised community concerns of
                centralization and integrity of the EOS blockchain. Similarly, there is concern as to what would occur if all Chinese BP
                servers were shut down by the authorities. EOS Go Blog (2019) Chinese dominance of EOS Governance, available at
                https:// bit .ly/ 2pHXaql
            310   Perez, Y (2019) Maker Foundation Reveals a “Critical Bug” in Its Governance Voting Contract, available at http:// bit .ly/
                2O3xu2S
            311   Hsieh, Y; Vergne, J & Wang, S (2018) The Internal and External Governance of Blockchain-based Organizations:
                Evidence from Crypto-currencies, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2JSjMKI
            312   Bitcoin scalability disputes (such as changing the Bitcoin block size) led to several competing hard forks being Bitcoin
                Core, Bitcoin Gold, Bitcoin Cash, Bitcoin ABC, Bitcoin Unlimited, and Bitcoin SV. O’Neal, S (2018) Bitcoin Cash Hard
                Fork Battle: Who Is Winning the Hash War, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2LtqHxb; Ouimet, S (2018) One Month Later, Which
                Crypto Is Winning the Bitcoin Cash Split?, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2XXd0Zj. Ethereum forked with regard to handling
                the consequences of ‘The DAO’ vulnerability spawning Ethereum Classic, ETH and ETC. Moskov, A (2019) Ethereum
                Classic vs Ethereum (ETC vs ETH): What’s the Difference?, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2M1GkLY. See also Zamfir, V (2019)
                Blockchain Governance 101, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2LuHqAn
            313   Vitalik (2017) Notes on Blockchain Governance, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2YjAnAE
            314   Vitalik (2017) Notes on Blockchain Governance, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2YjAnAE. See also Maas, T (2018) The Curious
                Tale of Tezos —from a $232 MILLION ICO to 4 class action lawsuits, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2GjswZl; Ayton, N (2017)
                What Lessons Can Be Learnt From Tezos ICO Debacle, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2Y67XKf; Casey, M (2018) It’s Too Soon
                for On-Chain Governance, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2M0OyUG
            315   Vitalik (2017) Notes on Blockchain Governance, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2YjAnAE
            316   ibid Perez, Y (2019) The controversies of blockchain governance and rough consensus, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2LYuy4X
            317   Van Wirdum, A (2016) Who Funds Bitcoin Core Development? How the Industry Supports Bitcoin's 'Reference Client',
                https:// bit .ly/ 2tTcPlf; Van Wirdum, A (2016) Bitcoin Core Launches 'Sponsorship Programme' to Fund Development and
                More, available at https:// bit .ly/ 2EMs6co; Bitcoin Core (2016) Bitcoin Core Sponsorship Programme FAQ, available at
                http:// bit .ly/ 2M0rNQo
            318   Novikov, I (2018) Why Are Crypto Exchanges Hacked So Often?, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2Y2lDC1
            319   Huang, R (2019) Kiva Partners With UN And Sierra Leone To Credit Score The Unbanked With Blockchain, available at
                http:// bit .ly/ 2SrqIT5
            320   Huang, R (2019) Kiva Partners With UN And Sierra Leone To Credit Score The Unbanked With Blockchain, available at
                http:// bit .ly/ 2SrqIT5
            321   1,461,501,637,330,902,918,203,684,832,716,283,019,655,932,542,976
            322   D’Aliessi (2016) How Does the Blockchain Work?, available at http:// bit .ly/ 2xRE6qa



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