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and factors that are likely to affect these
• Introduce non-discriminatory, wholesale open considerations include: Chapter 1
access to broadband infrastructure.

• Implement transparent procurement processes. • The development of the digital economy and
Internet maturity: Internet maturity includes
factors such as Internet take-up, availability of
Each of these elements is described in more detail compelling local content, and development
in the following sections.
of e-government initiatives to connect
schools, government offices and hospitals.
It also includes implementing and enforcing
1.4.1 Consideration of local market conditions cybersecurity regulations and improving ICT

literacy. Economies that can demonstrate
Managing authorities generally accept the greater Internet maturity – or those that
investment approaches and funding sources show they have plans in place to develop
described in this chapter. As a result, managing the Internet ecosystem – will drive Internet
authorities increasingly are focusing on how their traffic growth. This, in turn, will encourage
broadband vision (as defined in their national competitive investment in broadband
broadband plans) can be implemented and infrastructure.
adapted to local conditions. National broadband
plans set out a vision for broadband connectivity • Political landscape and ownership structures:
and development of ICTs, detailing broadband Managing authorities that retain whole or
coverage and speed targets and the actions part ownership of incumbent operators are
needed to help achieve them. Local conditions likely to be politicians’ favored recipients of

Box 1.6: Key lessons: Qatar National Broadband Network (QNBN)
• QNBN was granted a licence to offer wholesale services on an open, equal and non-
discriminatory basis, along with a mandate to set appropriate national wholesale prices
to enable downstream (retail) competition.

• Government funding of fibre networks can be used to reduce the investment required
from private operators, therefore attracting private sector interest in the network.

• Re-using existing passive infrastructure may reduce civil infrastructure build costs, but
dominant operators should be required to provide open access to their networks.

• By continuing to roll out FTTH aggressively, alternative operators (in this case Ooredoo)
might contribute to fulfilling the broadband vision in a different way than initially
expected – in this case independently of QNBN.

• This may mean putting the government intervention at risk and creating two separate
fibre networks. This risk should be taken into account prior to initiating an intervention
project.

• Operators should be consulted in advance to understand their roll-out plans; doing so
may avert the risk of duplicating fibre networks.

• National broadband networks can be considered for sale to the private sector subject
to regulatory approval and commercial due diligence. However, in this case, Vodafone's
proposed deal might have run counter to the original remit of QNBN (which was to
rent wholesale fibre capacity to both Vodafone Qatar and its rival Ooredoo) limiting
competition.

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